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ABSTRACT
Elaboration During Text Comprehension
(September, 1983)
Joseph Vincent DiCecco, B.A., LaSalle College
M.S., Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Jerome L. Myers
Many cognitive scientists assume that elaborations are generated
during the processing of connected discourse and are stored with
explicitly asserted information to form an integrated text
representation. An important aspect of this hypothesis is that the
generation and storage of elaborations is seen as occurring during the
ongoing comprehension process. These assumptions are theoretically
useful for the study of human memory because they provide a framework
for interpreting several notable memory phenomena. The research
documented in this dissertation was designed to evaluate the
elaborative processing assumptions. Four priming experiments were
conducted to study a specific type of elaboration, the inference.
Two different priming paradigms were employed. In Experiments 1
and 2, subjects read simple stories consisting of two or three
sentences. Comprehension of each story reguired the generation of a
bridging inference between the last two sentences. After reading each
vii
each story, subjects were required to perform word recognition
decisions which allowed an assessment of the activation level of
concepts in memory. The results of these experiments indicated that
concepts needed for inclusion in inferences were activated during the
reading of the stories. The data did not, however, support the
assumption that inferences are integrated during comprehension.
Experiments 3 and 4 employed a different style of story and a
different task—word naming. Results from these experiments
replicated the finding of inferred concept activation during reading,
but they, too, failed to support the assumption of inference
integration.
Discussion of these findings includes methodological
considerations as well as a presentation of some alternative
conceptualizations of the inference process. These alternatives may
be characterized by the suggestion that the storage of inferences is
either delayed or neglected altogether. Also, it is argued that
readers' intentions and motivations play important roles in the
inference process.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Although the information processing/computer analogy has provided
researchers with a fruitful approach to the study of human cognitive
abilities, there is at least one way in which it is misleading. In a
computer system, memory is primarily a passive structure; data simply
reside there until a user or user-invoked program accesses them. When
access occurs, the user obtains only the data asked for and nothing
more. In contrast, the human memory system is a dynamic structure.
It supports all of our cognitive processes by providing specific input
(either automatically or consciously) to cognitive operations ranging
from perception to problem solving. People who study "context
effects" on human information processing are usually referring to the
impact of some form of memory on current processing.
This dissertation is also concerned in a general way with memory
and its effects on information processing. The focus of the work
presented here is on the impact of memory in the form of general world
knowledge, or semantic memory, on the processing of connected
discourse. The importance of this type of memory for discourse
comprehension has been made explicit in the prevailing view of
language processing. In this view, writers and speakers include in
their communications only as much information as is necessary to
provide a message framework; the comprehender can be relied on to use
his or her knowledge base to embellish or fill in the gaps in the
1
message (e.g., see Schank, 1976, or Haviland & Clark, 1974). For
example, during the Vietnam War era, many a stunned eighteen year-old
male was asked what was in the letter he had just received; if he
replied, "Greetings from the President of the United States," usually
nothing more needed to be said. Of course, miscommunications occur if
a person assumes that certain information is in a comprehender 1 s
knowledge base when it is not. Thus, the example above fails if you
are not familiar with the salutation from the United States Selective
Service draft letter.
Cognitive psychologists refer to the process of embellishing
discourse as elaboration. In the next section of this chapter, I will
present an elaborative processing view of comprehension along with the
theoretical motivation for such a view.
Elaboration and Text Processing
Elaborations Provide Interconnections in Memory . As noted above, the
concept of elaboration provides a useful way of describing the
efficiency believed to be inherent in communication acts. The
interest here, however, is on considering its theoretical implications
for text memory. It is commonly believed that comprehenders routinely
use world knowledge to expand on the information they receive. The
position that emerges from the literature is that elaborations are
generated during comprehension, and they serve to unify and enrich the
representation of the material that has been processed (Anderson,
1976; Anderson & Reder, 1979; Anderson & Ortony, 1975; Kintsch, 1974;
Miller, 1981; Reder, (Note 1); Schank, 1976; Smith, 1981; Thorndyke,
1976). Smith (1981) presents the modal position on this point.
Readers are confronted with sets of facts embedded in text. A
particular set of facts can be viewed as forming an input network of
propositions. Elaborations are additional facts which are added to
the input network during comprehension via world knowledge. The
structure that results is referred to as an "elaborated network," and
it represents the combination of information from two sources—the
input network, and the comprehender
' s knowledge base.
According to Smith, the construction of the elaborated network is
what is at the heart of the comprehension process. Elaborations
increase the number of interconnections between facts that are input.
By adding interconnections to the network, elaboration makes for a
more comprehensible and a more memorable input by virtue of the
multiple retrieval routes available to any one fact. Miller (1981)
has incorporated just this position in a computer simulation of
sentence processing and memory.
Elaboration and Integration . Elaborative processing has come to be
seen as the theoretical mechanism underlying the concept of
integration. Chiesi, Spilich, and Voss (1979) and Spilich, Vesonder,
Chiesi, and Voss (1979) have found that people who have extensive
knowledge of a topic are better at acguiring (integrating) and using
new information from within the topic domain than people with little
knowledge. The explanation given for this result is that a high
knowledge individual is better able to elaborate and interconnect the
new material. The richer knowledge base of such an individual can
support these activities to a greater extent.
There are a number of other studies that point to the importance
of elaboration as an integrative process during comprehension. The
basic result of these experiments is that a title, theme, or picture
that disambiguates hard to comprehend passages will improve recall
performance if given prior to reading the text. Such aids do not
improve recall when provided after reading (Bransford & Johnson, 1972,
1973; Dooling & Lachman, 1971; Dooling & Mullet, 1973). The
explanation given for this effect is that the title or theme allows
the comprehender to use world knowledge to elaborate the input, and an
elaborated input is a more memorable input. Apparently, with these
ambiguous materials, elaboration can not occur retroactively since the
themes did not improve recall when given after passages were read.
Elaboration has also been used as an explanatory mechanism in
resolving the "Paradox of Interference" (Moeser, 1979; Myers, O'Brien,
Balota, & Toyofuku, Mote 2; Smith, 1981; Smith, Adams, & Schorr,
1978). The paradox arises from consideration of the well established
finding that as the number of facts one is asked to learn about a
topic increases, the ability to retrieve any one of them decreases
(Anderson & Bower, 1973; Anderson, 1974; Anderson, 1976; Reder &
Anderson, 1980a). This so-called "fan effect," if taken to its
extreme, seems to preclude the possibility of expertise in any
domain. The resolution of the paradox starts with the contention that
experiments that have demonstrated fan effects have employed materials
and procedures that made it difficult to form a coherent structure
from the input facts. When the additional facts to be learned about a
topic are easily integrated with the existing facts, fan effects tend
to disappear (Myers et al., Note 2; Smith et al, 1978).
Elaboration is the key concept in understanding this resolution
of the paradox. Elaborations are additional propositions,
propositions that stem from our world knowledge. These are added to
the memory representation and are connected with the explicitly
presented material. The interconnections in the network provide more
retrieval routes to each fact represented, and increasing the number
of retrieval routes speeds retrieval. Thus, the degraded memory
performance incurred by adding facts to a network (increasing
propositional fan), is compensated for by the facilitating effect of
the additional retrieval routes provided by the elaborations.
Two recent studies corroborate this position by showing that when
elaborations are explicitly provided, memory performance is enhanced.
Black and Bower (1979) added filler actions to simple stories that
provided explicit elaborations of target actions. Subjects who
studied the stories with the additional material recalled more of the
target actions than did subjects who did not have additional
material. In a study of probability learning, Myers, Hansen, Robson,
and McCann (1983) found that subjects who studied an elaborated text
solved more story problems than subjects who study less elaborate
re
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texts (story problems were word problems whose solution depended on
the integration of the facts presented in the text).
One other recent study stands in apparent contradiction to those
just cited. Reder and Anderson (1980b) investigated recognition
accuracy for the main points of a passage when those points wer
either embedded in their text or extracted in the form of
unelaborated summary. Whether tested immediately or with delays of up
to one year, the main points presented in summary form were remembered
better. Reder and Anderson themselves suggest, however, that this
unexpected finding may be due to the use of recognition accuracy as a
dependent measure; this measure may not be sensitive to the benefits
of the elaborated network structure. Furthermore, the materials used
in the experiments were taken from college texts, and seem to have
been rather dry. Subjects may simply have lacked the motivation to
construct an integrated network from the texts.
Inferential Processing: A Theoretical Framework
Inference as a Special Case of Elaboration
. Thus far, I have been
discussing elaborative processing as an aid to comprehension,
something that can enrich the understanding of discourse. It is a
difficult subject for study, however. As Anderson and Reder (1979)
have pointed out, elaboration is often an idiosyncratic process. The
number and type of elaborations that are generated for any given text
are probably affected by the motivation and intention of the
7comprehended In view of this problem, the approach I have taken in
attempting a study of elaboration is to write experimental materials
that manipulate the process-materials that direct the comprehender
along certain pre-defined elaborative paths. The way to do this is
suggested by the fact that comprehenders can often fill in information
when they encounter gaps in text. In fact, there are certain
situations where this gap-filling process is essential for
comprehension to be possible. Consider this pair of sentences used in
an experiment by Haviland and Clark (1974):
We checked the picnic supplies.
The beer was warm.
Most people would not find it difficult to understand the connection
between these sentences, in spite of the fact that on the surface they
are not very coherent. Using Haviland and Clark's terminology, we
construct a "bridging inference" in order to comprehend the sentence
pair as a unit. This is a conceptual structure which links the
information expressed by the first sentence with the new information
given in the second. The bridging inference which is likely to be
constructed from the sentences above would be something like "The
picnic supplies contained some beer."
Haviland and Clark (1974) attempted to validate their concept of
bridging inference. They reasoned that since the inference process
makes additional demands on the comprehender, people would need more
time to understand sentences which require that bridging structures be
built to provide connections with previous sentences. This prediction
was supported by their experiments. The sentence pair above requires
inferential processing; the following pair was a control pair not
requiring inferential processing:
We got some beer out of the trunk.
The beer was warm.
Compared with the control pair, subjects took almost 200 milliseconds
(msec) longer to comprehend the second sentence of the
inference-inducing pair. A similar result has been reported by
Garnham (1981).
Types of Inference
. The bridging inference can be thought of as a
"necessary" elaboration. It is the tool through which we can examine
the elaboration process and its role in memory representation more
exactly. Before continuing with a review of the relevant literature,
it is worth considering the idea of necessity in inference.
Harris and Monaco (1978) make the distinction between two basic
types of inference: logical and pragmatic. A logical inference
represents information that is necessarily implied by the text. For
example, "Randy forced Ed to clean the fish tank" leads to the logical
inference that Ed cleaned the fish tank. In contrast, a pragmatic
inference represents information that is probably, but not
necessarily, true given the text. Thus, "Randy asked Ed to clean the
fish tank" only pragmatically implies that Ed did so.
To ascertain whether an inference is logical or whether it is
pragmatic is easy. The test procedure given by Harris and Monaco
consists of conjoining the implication-making sentence with the
negation of its implication. If the resulting sentence does not make
sense, the inference is logically implied; if it does make sense, the
inference is only pragmatically implied. The sentence "Randy forced
Ed to clean the fish tank, but Ed didn't do it" does not make sense;
on the other hand, "Randy asked Ed to clean the fish tank, but Ed
didn't do it" is sensible.
There is another type of necessity when considering inference
during comprehension of connected discourse. This is the necessity
exemplified by the Haviland and Clark (1974) sentence pairs presented
earlier. At certain points in a text, inferences are necessary to
provide connections between the current sentence and one encountered
earlier. These inferences are necessary for the maintenance of
coherence, but do not have to be necessary in the logical sense.
Singer and Ferreira (in press) refer to these as "backward
inferences," and contrast them with "forward inferences" which may be
logical or pragmatic, but do not contribute to maintenance of text
coherence.
One type of forward pragmatic inference, the instrument
inference, has been the object of a number of studies (Corbett &
Dosher, 1978; Dosher & Corbett, 1982; McKoon & Ratcliff, 1981; Paris &
10
Lindauer, 1976; Singer, 1979). With this type of implicate, people
make inferences about agents given information about certain actions.
Inferring that a maid used a broom when informed only that she swept a
floor is an example of instrumental inference. We will examine the
content of this instrumental inference literature shortly. My main
point at this time is that these inferences are not logically
necessary in the Harris and Monaco (1978) sense, nor are they
necessary when considering text coherence.
Because of the idiosyncracies involved in elaboration, the safest
type of inference to study is the backward inference. By manipulating
text characteristics, an experimenter can control the location and
content of these with more reliability than could be expected with
forward inferences. The key to controlling the backward inference
lies in understanding the concept of text coherence. Both Thorndyke
(1976) and Kintsch and van Dijk (1978) have proposed models of text
processing which are based on this concept. In the next section, I
will briefly review those models, emphasizing the role and character
of inferential processing.
Models of Text Processing and Inference . Thorndyke (1976) has
proposed a very general frame-based model for text comprehension. He
claims that comprehension is governed by an overriding frame or
situational context. The frame's purpose is to aid the comprehension
process by facilitating the maintenance of text coherence and
continuity. It does this by providing a mechanism which
11
simultaneously stores new material and generates expectations based on
that material. When a new text idea is comprehended, a set of forward
inferences (elaborations) consistent with it is generated and stored
in the frame along with the current text idea. The frame then
provides expectations for the next input. If that input does not
match any expectations, then Thorndyke claims that backward inferences
are generated to establish a bridge (Haviland & Clark, 1974) from the
input to a different frame. This new frame is then instantiated, and
it is used to store the new input along with the backward inferences
that connect it to the previous frame.
Kintsch and van Dijk provide much more detail on the basics of
text processing. In particular, they address the concept of text
coherence in a much more specific way. They do not describe the
processes involved in accepting physical input; they start, instead,
with semantic input in the form of propositions derived from the
discourse. These propositions form the basis of two knowledge
structures. First, the microstructure , or text base, is a network of
propositions constructed from the text. Second, the macrostructure
,
or gist of the passage, is constructed concurrently with the
microstructure from generalizations of micropropositions
.
The theory is most clearly specified at the level of the
microstructure. What Kintsch and van Dijk have done is to make the
maintenance of semantic coherence a necessary condition in the
construction of the text base. The mechanism for accomplishing this
is the criterion of referential coherence, realized in the form of
12
prepositional overlap; two propositions are referentially coherent if
they have at least one argument in common.
The process by which the text base is formed starts with a chunk of
several propositions abstracted from the text. These are stored in a
working memory and then linked to each other via shared arguments. A
small number of these propositions are placed in a special buffer and
kept active; selection of the active propositions is accomplished by
the use of a "leading-edge" strategy which emphasizes recency and
importance. (An "important" proposition is one that is connected to a
large number of other propositions.) This strategy keeps active those
propositions that are most likely to be related to the next chunk of
propositions that are encountered; thus, the buffer serves to
facilitate the construction of the microstructure by increasing the
likelihood of coherence from chunk to chunk.
The processes described so far have been hypothesized to aid in
the construction of a coherent text base, but obviously there will be
cycles when the propositions in a chunk will not overlap with the
propositions in the buffer or with each other (as is often the case
when encountering a new paragraph or chapter). In these cases,
Kintsch and van Dijk claim that the text base constructed to that
point may be searched for a proposition that shares an argument with
any of those in the current chunk. If one can be found, it is
reinstated in the buffer to maintain coherence. If one cannot be
found, the comprehender 1 s world knowledge must be accessed so that a
bridging inference (Haviland & Clark, 1974) can be constructed to
13
connect one or more of the propositions in the chunk with previously
processed propositions in the text base. The proposition or
propositions that make up the bridging structure are then themselves
added to the text base. A straightforward implication of the
inference process as stated here is that it uses limited-capacity
resources and should increase the time needed for comprehension of a
sentence. The model's position on this point was obviously informed
by Haviland and Clark's (1974) findings cited earlier.
While Kintsch and van Dijk's model places the inference process
in the larger context of text processing, they do not speculate on its
specifics. Consistent with Kintsch and van Dijk's position, however,
is a slightly more detailed model of the inference process proposed by
McKoon and Ratcliff (1980b) which consists of three stages: access,
activation, and integration. During the first stage, information that
is to be inferred must be accessed in memory. In the second, that
information is activated, or brought into a working memory buffer.
(McKoon and Ratcliff are not clear on the distinction between these
first two stages; I am not sure that the distinction is even
necessary.) Finally, the activated information is connected to the
information in the text that caused it to be activated. The result of
this process is a memory structure which consists of asserted text
propositions, inferred propositions, and connections between them.
This general model of text and inference processing has come into
wide acceptance. It makes two assumptions that are worth
considering. First, it is assumed that inferences that are made to
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maintain text coherence occur in an on-line fashion; that is, they
occur during the encoding of the text. Second, the inferred
information is then connected with the asserted text, forming an
integrated representation of the text in memory. In the next section,
I will review experiments that address these assumptions.
Inferential Processing: A Review of Empirical Work
There is an abundant literature on inferential processing, the
bulk of which claims to be consistent with the two assumptions stated
above. Although we are interested here in experiments that address
the generation of backward inferences, a number of studies have also
been done on forward inference. These will be considered in this
review also; one implication of this work is if evidence can be found
that forward inferences are routinely generated and stored during
comprehension, backward inferences must be also.
The experiments that have been reported represent a number of
different paradigms. As will be argued later in this section, the
choice of experimental paradigm is an important consideration for the
study of inference. Thus, the articles that will be discussed here
will be grouped by paradigm. My aim is to present the papers that are
representative of their paradigms.
Recall/Recognition Memory
.
Thorndyke
' s (1976) model of the inference
process claims that backward inferences are generated when necessary
15
to maintain text coherence and continuity. These inferences are then
stored in a newly-instantiated frame with the input that occasioned
them. To test thxs claim, Thorndyke (1976) obtained false alarm rates
for sentences which represented inferences that were likely to have
been drawn. Embedded in each of the passages was a sentence (the
continuation) whose comprehension sometimes depended on an inferential
bridge back to an earlier sentence (the target). An example of the
different types of critical sentences is given below:
Target: The hamburger chain owner was afraid his love for
french fries would ruin his marriage.
Inference Continuation:
The hamburger chain owner decided to join
weight
-watchers in order to save his marriage.
Neutral Continuation:
The hamburger chain owner decided to see a marriage
counselor in order to save his marriage.
Thorndyke wrote a set of potential inferences which would be either
appropriate, neutral, or inappropriate given the continuation
sentences in the stories. Examples based on the target and
continuation sentences given above are:
Appropriate: The hamburger chain owner was very fat.
Neutral: The hamburger chain owner got his french fries for
free.
Inappropriate: The hamburger chain owner's wife didn't like french
fries
.
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A sample of subjects was asked to read each passage and then rate it
for comprehensibility, imagery, and meaningfulness
. After all of the
stories had been read and rated, a surprise recognition test was given
on sentences from the passages. When the neutral continuation was
present in the story, false alarm rates were equally low (roughly
equal to 25 percent) for the three different types of inference. When
the inference-inducing continuation was present, however, false alarm
rates varied from almost zero for inappropriate inferences to 58
percent for appropriate ones; thus, in the case of the
inference-inducing continuation, subjects claimed that they saw
sentences in the stories that they could have only inferred. It is
interesting to note that the false alarm rate for neutral inferences,
although significantly lower than for appropriate inferences, is still
quite high—40 percent. From these results, Thorndyke concluded that
both forward and backward inferences are generated and stored during
text comprehension.
I have described Thorndyke' s study in some detail because it is
predicated on the model discussed above, and also because it is an
attempt to study the backward inference. Some other studies are
investigations of forward, or non-necessary inferences. Masson (1979)
investigated the recall of sentences like "The container held the
apples" as a function of whether they were cued at the time of
recall. The cues were words like "basket" which were based on
inferable information. Masson found that presenting the cue at the
time of recall did not improve memory performance unless the same cue
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was present at encoding. Thus, subjects did not normally generate and
include the inferable words in the sentence representatxon. In a
different study, Masson (1979) devised an orienting task in order to
establish an inferential context for sentence encoding. Subjects were
given a pair of words for each sentence presented to them; they were
asked to indicate which word was more related to the overall meaning
of the sentence. For the apple container sentence, the words were
"carry" and "harvest." Masson reasoned that such a task would foster
the inferential processing he was looking for, and would make the
inferred word cues effective at recall without their presence at
encoding. He did, in fact, find that the word cues now improved
sentence recall; his conclusion was that under the appropriate
conditions, pragmatic inferences are made at encoding, and that
explicit and inferred information is stored in an integrated memory
representation.
Although Thorndyke (1976) and Masson (1979) claimed that their
results support the notion of on-line generation and storage of
inferences, there are serious criticisms that could be made of both
studies. In Thorndyke 's study, it is not clear whether the inferences
are being generated during the encoding of the text, during the rating
of the text for comprehensibility, imagery, and meaningfulness , or at
the time of sentence recognition. Masson' s experiment worked only
because subjects performed the word relatedness task after encoding
each sentence. This is an artificial situation contrived to induce
inferential processing; conditions are too far removed from the
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standard reading situation to have any relevance for a model of
inferential/elaborative text processing.
Corbett and Dosher (1978) have reported a series of experiments
on instrument inference. Their work does not support the conclusion
that this obvious sort of elaboration is generated and stored during
encoding. They were able to replicate a Paris and Lindauer (1976)
finding that highly likely instruments (e.g., scissors) are good
recall cues for sentences that imply them (e.g., The athlete cut out
an article for his friend). Contrary to what Paris and Lindauer
suggested, however, Corbett and Dosher 's study shows that this does
not mean that the implied instrument must have been inferred and added
to the sentence at encoding. They found that the highly likely
instruments were also good recall cues when unlikely instruments
(e.g., razorblade) were explicitly mentioned as instruments. Corbett
and Dosher concluded that inferences not needed for comprehension are
not generated during encoding, even though they may represent obvious
implications of the asserted text.
Garnham (1982) takes it for granted that backward inferences are
made during encoding. His guestion, like Corbett and Dosher 's (1978),
was whether forward inferences are also generated on line. He used
passages that contained explicit and implicit references to
instruments and conducted tests of both recognition and recall
memory. His data did not discriminate between the on-line hypothesis
and a deferred inference hypothesis which claims that forward
inferences are made only when needed for answering specific
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questions. Garnham's data are consistent with an xntermedaat
position, the omissions hypothesis, and he suggests that it is worth
considering for the case of instrumental inference. This model holds
that highly probable instruments are not stored in memory since they
can be easily inferred at a later time through the use of world
knowledge. When an improbable instrument is encountered in text,
however, it must be stored since it cannot be reconstructed later.
When no instrument is mentioned in a sentence, nothing is encoded in
memory; the subject's memory performance will be the same as when
highly likely instruments are explicitly mentioned.
To summarize the work presented above, the evidence that emerges
from the recall and recognition memory paradigms does not provide
direct support for the on-line generation and storage hypothesis for
coherence-maintaining, or backward, inference. Evidence concerning
the generation of forward inferences is equivocal, and it can not
provide indirect support for the hypothesis.
Reading Time
.
Reading time for sentences has been examined in studies
of both forward and backward inference. Forward inference was
investigated by Singer (1979), who constructed sentence pairs similar
to those used by Haviland and Clark (1974). Subjects read a first
sentence which either implied or explicitly mentioned an instrument
for some action. Sample first sentences are:
Direct Mention: The boy cleared the snow with a shovel.
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Inference: The boy cleared the snow from the stairs.
Control: The boy hated working with a shovel.
Next, the subjects were asked to read a second sentence which
mentioned the instrument and indicate when they had comprehended it.
For the set of first sentences given above, the second sentence was
"The shovel was heavy." Singer reasoned that if instrument inferences
are not generated during encoding, the lack of coherence between the
inference sentence and the second sentence should increase second
sentence comprehension time relative to the direct mention condition.
On the other hand, if subjects generate instrument inferences during
the encoding of the first sentence, the concept "SHOVEL" will be
included in the representation of the inference sentence. There will
be no break in coherence between the inference and second sentences,
and therefore the comprehension times will not differ for the two
conditions. (Note that this logic is based on the assumption of
on-line backward inferencing. ) The results of two experiments of this
type indicate that instrument inferences are not drawn during
encoding; comprehension time increased by more than 100 msec when
inference sentences preceded second sentences. This difference is not
attributable to the mere repetition of the word "shovel" in the direct
inference case; this is because the inference condition did not differ
from a control condition which required a different sort of inference
(the shovel mentioned in the control sentence is the same as that
mentioned in the second sentence) but repeated the word "shovel."
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Although Singer's (1979) experiments do not suggest the existence
of an on-line forward inference process, they do replicate the results
of Haviland and Clark (1974) and thus provide indxrect support for a
backward inference process. Haviland and Clark's (1974) reading time
study of backward inference has been described in detail earlier.
Gamham (1981) conducted a similar study, and consistent with the
Haviland and Clark results, he found that subjects took longer to
comprehend sentences which added new and non-coherent information to a
text representation.
These reading/comprehension time studies indicate that processing
load increases when a reader needs to make a backward inference.
Unfortunately, as McKoon and Ratcliff (1980b) have argued, deciding
which processes are responsible for the increase in load is
problematic. There is no independent evidence that subjects are, in
fact, engaged in inferential processing.
Sentence Verification
.
Keenan and Kintsch (reported in Kintsch, 1974,
Chapter 8) asked subjects to read paragraphs that provided explicit
details or implied details. After reading, the participants performed
a sentence verification task; they had to decide whether test
sentences were true based on either explicit or implicit information
expressed by the paragraph. With immediate testing, reaction time
(RT) to true sentences was faster when they had been explicitly
presented than when they had been only implied. After a 20-minute
delay, however, subjects were equally fast to verify either explicit
s no
on
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or implicit information. Kintsch's interpretation is that there i
difference in our ability to retrieve explxcit or implicit mformati
except at short delays between learning and test. In this case,
memory for surface features of explicit information iS still availabl
and will speed verification. Based on the equivalence of long-term
memory performance for explicit and implicit propositions, Kintsch
argued that implied propositions must be generated and stored during
encoding; they join with the explicit material to form an integrated
memory representation.
Reder (Note 1; 1979) has reported a similar result. Subjects
made plausibility judgments faster for explicit information at
immediate test. There was no difference, however, for judgements
about explicit or implicit information at either a short (several
minutes) or long (2 days) delay.
Of these two studies, Keenan and Kintsch's data is more
generalizable to the normal reading situation. Reder 's experiments
were implemented with a question-asking procedure designed to force
certain elaborations while the subjects were reading the passages.
This is something that is not normally part of the comprehension
process. Keenan and Kintsch's data are problematic as well,
unfortunately. The finding of no difference in the time to verify
explicit or implicit information is crucial to the on-line
hypothesis. But it is quite possible that the inferential processing
that Keenan and Kintsch claim is occurring at encoding is actually
occurring sometime during the 20-minute delay interval.
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Singer and Ferreira (in press) have conducted a verification
experiment of backward inference that is not subject to this
criticism; their test sentences always came immediately after
comprehension. Subjects read stories which contained sentences like
"He [a spy] quickly threw his report in the fire." This sentence
allows the forward inference that the report burned. If the sentence
was followed by "The ashes floated up the chimney," however, the
inference is now backward and necessary for coherence. It was found
that time to respond to the question "Did Bob [the spy] burn the
report?" was 218 msec faster when the backward inference-inducing
sentence was included in the story.
Singer and Ferreira 's conclusion was that backward inferences are
drawn at encoding more reliably than forward inferences; they argue
that the RT advantage for the backward inference condition reflects
the storage and use of backward inferences. This seems to be an
unwarranted interpretation, however. The problem is that there is no
independent evidence that the RT difference between the two conditions
reflects a difference in inference processing. This is a problem
because each story in the the backward inference condition contained
an additional sentence. The additional sentence included words
semantically related to concepts in the test question (e.g., ashes and
chimney)
.
It could be the existence of this asserted information that
speeds the answer latencies in the backward condition, not the
existence of inferred information in the text representation.
Specifically, the subjects could simply be doing "plausability checks"
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(Reder, Mote 1; 1979; Reder & Anderson, 1980a), and the inclusion of
more information consistent with the what is bexng asserted in the
question makes the affirmative decision more plausible.
Priming. Before discussing the work of McKoon and Ratcliff (1980b),
some general comments about this paradigm are in order. Priming
refers to a measurable effect that the processing of one event has on
the processing of a subsequent event. The facilitative priming effect
is presumed to reflect an increase in the accessibility of information
in memory. Memory structures that have been primed are commonly said
to be "activated," and activated information is information that has
been used recently in some way (Collins & Loftus, 1975). Although the
priming paradigm has been used extensively as a way of specifying the
nature of semantic memory structure and processing, priming effects
are not limited to this domain. They have been observed also in
experiments which have required retrieval of information from more
recently experienced, or episodic, materials as well (McKoon &
Ratcliff, 1979; 1980a; Ratcliff & McKoon, 1978; Swinney, 1979). This
has been a welcome finding for cognitive researchers because it means
that the priming paradigm can be used as a tool to explore complex
mental processes that occur during reading or listening. Because
priming reflects which memory structures have been activated, and also
because activation occurs in a matter of milliseconds (Ratcliff &
McKoon, 1981), we can investigate comprehension processes in an
on-line fashion. The priming paradigm enables us to trace the flow of
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activation through memory, allowing us to observe the isolated
retrieval operations that take place during complex cognitive
processing. In addition to obtaining information about activation
processes, priming allows us to investigate the structure of memory.
The degree to which one concept primes another is an indication of
their degree of connection in memory.
McKoon and Ratcliff (1980b) took advantage of the priming
paradigm to study a special case of inferential processing, anaphoric
reference. Anaphoric reference refers to the connection made by a
comprehender between two different references to the same object.
McKoon and Ratcliff constructed four-sentence paragraphs which
mentioned a critical word, the referent, in the first sentence (e.g.,
"A BURGLAR surveyed the garage set back from the street"), and then
referred to it again in the fourth sentence by either the same name or
by an anaphore ("The CRIMINAL slipped away from the streetlamp" )
.
Immediately after reading the paragraph, the subjects were shown a
word and asked to indicate whether or not it had appeared in any of
the four sentences. When the fourth sentence contained an anaphore,
the word recognition decision to critical words was made faster
relative to a fourth sentence containing only a neutral word. (For
this story, the neutral word was "cat.") Furthermore, when words
which were in the same proposition as the referent (e.g., garage) were
tested, word recognition RT was faster when the fourth sentence
contained either the referent or its anaphore, compared to the neutral
word. These results indicate that anaphores not only activate their
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referents, but also activate concepts connected to the referents in
the text representation.
Given the evidence that anaphores activate their referents and
related propositions, McKoon and Ratcliff next considered whether the
proposition containing the referent was then connected in memory with
the proposition containing the anaphore. In terms of the example
materials given above, the question is whether the reader connects
"surveying the garage" and "slipping away from the steetlamp" with the
same referent, the burglar, regardless of whether the referent or
anaphore is presented in the fourth sentence. Evidence for the
connection of concepts in memory comes from the existence of priming
between them. The experimental situation was changed to accommodate
the new question. Subjects read two passages at a time and then were
asked to make consecutive word recognition decisions on a list of 10
words. The list contained critical prime-target word pairings to test
for priming between concepts. One such pair is BURGLAR-STREETLAMP
which matches the referent mentioned in the first sentence with an
object mentioned in the final sentence. If there is a connection
between referent and anaphore propositions, RT to STREETLAMP following
BURGLAR should be the same whether the final sentence mentions BURGLAR
or CRIMINAL. In the first case, BURGLAR is explicitly connected to
STREETLAMP since they are both mentioned in the final sentence. In
the second case, the anaphoric reference process connects the first
and final sentences which separately contain the two words. RT to
STREETLAMP should be slower when the final sentence only mentions the
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same
neutral word since only the minimal connection of being i„ the
paragraph should exist between BURGLAR and STREETLAMP in this case.
These predictions were all supported by the data.
McKoon and Ratcliff have thus provided support for their model of
the inference process presented earlier. They have found evidence for
two of the three component processes they postulate: activation and
integration. What are the implications of these results on anaphoric
reference for our understanding of backward inference? I believe that
the implications are limited. There seems to be a large difference in
the amount of cognitive effort expended in performing these two
processes. Anaphoric reference involves only a backward search
through a text base to find a likely referent; this is followed by the
connection of propositions which contain the referent and anaphore and
that are already in the text base. In contrast, backward inference
involves a search of the comprehender
' s entire knowledge base in an
attempt to build a bridging structure. This structure is essentially
a new input to the text base and must be integrated with it. Although
their results on anaphoric reference are at best suggestive for my
topic, I have covered McKoon and Ratcliff* s experiment in detail
because it provides a relevant example of the logic of the priming
paradigm applied to a question about discourse processing.
Other studies have been reported recently that used the priming
paradigm to investigate instrument inference. McKoon and Ratcliff
(1981) conducted a series of experiments modeled almost exactly after
their anaphoric reference studies, and they report evidence for the
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activation and integration of inferred instruments.
Dosher and Corbett (1982) employed the Stroop task as a measure
of inferred instrument concept activation. In the Stroop task,
subjects must name the ink color in which letter strings are printed.
If the string is a word, the automatic implicit word naming response
interferes with the articulation of the word's color. The more
activated a concept is, the more interference is observed in the
task. Thus, the Stroop task is a "negative" priming paradigm. In
four separate experiments, Dosher and Corbett found that the reading
of sentences which implied the use of certain instruments did not
interfere with Stroop performance on those instrument words; this
indicates that the implied instruments had not been activated during
sentence encoding. Interestingly enough, though, in their fifth
experiment, Dosher and Corbett instructed subjects to consciously
generate the most likely instrument prior to the Stroop trial. In
this case, the data revealed activation for implied instrument
concepts. Based on these results, their conclusion was that
instrument inferences are not generated automatically during encoding;
this position is consistent with that taken in their earlier cued
recall paper (Corbett & Dosher, 1978).
As mentioned previously, evidence that forward inferences are
generated and stored during encoding indirectly supports the assertion
that backward inferences must be also. Even though, then, these last
two articles deal with forward instead of backward inference, the
discrepancy between McKoon and Ratcliff's (1981) and Dosher and
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Corbetf
s (1982) conclusions requires attention. I will return to
this problem in the General Discussion chapter to come.
One last priming study deserves a brief mention here. Newsome
(Note 3) performed a study of pragmatic inference. For example, given
the sentence "The karate champion hit the cinder block," a likely
pragmatic inference is that the cinder block broke. Using the lexical
decision task (deciding whether a letter string is a word), Newsome
found that implied verbs (e.g., "broke" for the sentence above) were
activated immediately after processing the sentence. Her overall
situation was very unlike reading, however. Subjects were shown
single sentences like the above for up to 15 seconds and were asked to
rate them for the ease with which they could visualize the scene that
was being conveyed. They next saw a context frame consisting of the
original sentence minus the verb (i.e., "The karate champion
the cinder block.") for two seconds, and then finally saw the lexical
decision stimulus. This sequence of events seems likely to have
caused subjects to perform mental operations that are not normally a
part of the reading process.
To summarize, the priming approach to the study of inference has
much to recommend it. It has the ability to monitor cognitive
operations on-line, and because of this it can provide specific
information about the component sub-processes involved in complex
behavior. These features allow it to avoid all of the problems
manifested by the other paradigms presented in this section. It was
the approach of choice for the work to be presented in the coming
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chapters.
The priming studies that have been reviewed here have not
provided any evidence relating to the generation of backward
inferences. They have instead addressed the problem of forward
inference. Furthermore, the data are ambiguous, given the conflicting
results of McKoon and Ratcliff (1981) and Dosher and Corbett (1982),
or not relevant to the reading situation (Newsome, Note 3).
General Summary
Cognitive psychologists have appealed to the notion of
elaborative processing in their accounts of certain phenomena dealing
with learning, memory, and comprehension. It is commonly accepted
that elaborations are generated during the encoding of information,
and that they are stored with the explicitly asserted information to
form an integrated representation in memory. The purpose of this
dissertation is to evaluate this claim.
My approach to the problem is to study the backward inference
process. Inference is simply a special case of elaboration; it is a
process that is more constrained than elaboration, especially in the
case of the backward inference. Existing studies of inference were
reviewed and shown to be inadeguate at providing data that bear on the
elaborative processing hypothesis. The commonly used memory paradigms
are open to the criticism that they can not discriminate whether
inferencing occurs at encoding, at test, or some time between.
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Reading time studies have indicated that processing load increases
when inferences need to be drawn, but we can only guess that the cause
of the load is the inferential process. Furthermore, these studies do
not provide any information about the exact nature of the processes
involved in inference. I have argued that the optimal approach for
the study of inference is the priming paradigm. Experiments based on
this methodology will avoid the problems cited previously.
In what follows, four priming experiments will be described. In
general, they are concerned with the same two stages of inferential
processing that McKoon and Ratcliff (1980b) were concerned with in
their study of anaphoric reference. I am looking for evidence that
concepts included in bridging structures are activated during
encoding, and that this information is connected with explicitly
presented concepts.
CHAPTER II
EXPERIMENT 1
The elaborative processing hypothesis claims that elaborations
are generated during comprehension, and that they interconnect
explicitly presented facts. This experiment was designed to directly
investigate the hypothesis. As mentioned earlier, there is a problem
with studying elaboration in that it is an idiosyncratic process. In
view of this fact, the general approach taken here was the same as
Reder's (1976; 1979); the situation was designed so as to be almost
certain that subjects were generating particular elaborations. Reder
accomplished this by requiring her subjects periodically to answer
elaboration-inducing questions while reading stories. Rather than
intrude on the reader's natural processing of a text, the specific
approach used in the experiments reported here was to have subjects
read materials that required inferential processing in order to be
comprehensible. Consider this pair of sentences:
[1] The situation was uncomfortable at the baseball game.
[2] Jane was sorry she had forgotten her umbrella.
At the semantic level, these sentences are coherent if it is inferred
that the uncomfortable situation mentioned in sentence [1] is rain.
According to the elaborative processing view, an inferential process
establishes the relationship between two sentences via elaborated
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concepts (e.g., "rain at the ball game"). Elaborations are stored
along with the concepts which have been derived from the sentences to
form a single interconnected representation.
The important point in the development above is this:
Inferential/elaborative processing adds not only concepts to a text
representation but also links from those elaborations to explicitly
presented concepts. If this is true, those links should serve as
pathways for the activation of explicitly presented concepts by
elaborated ones, or vice versa. Thus, after a reader has constructed
a text representation enriched with elaborations, any use of
elaborated concepts by that reader should facilitate the subsequent
use of explicitly presented concepts, provided the hypothesized links
are in place. This is simply a restatement of the fundamental
assertion of spreading activation models of memory processing
(Anderson, 1976; Collins & Loftus, 1975).
The priming approach to the investigation of the elaborative
processing hypothesis was operationalized as follows. Subjects were
asked to read simple three-sentence stories. The stories were written
such that the last two sentences were like sentences [1] and [2],
i.e., incoherent at the surface level, but comprehensible if the
appropriate inferential bridges were constructed. Immediately after
reading a story, subjects performed a word recognition task in a
paradigm similar to that used by McKoon and Ratcliff (1980b) and
Ratcliff and McKoon (1981). Six words were presented one at a time;
subjects indicated as quickly as possible whether or not each word had
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appeared in any of the three preceding sentences. Included in the
series of six words was a critical prime-target pair. The prime was a
word corresponding to a concept likely to have been elaborated in an
attempt to establish coherence between the second and third
sentences. The target was a word from the second sentence which was
likely to be connected to the prime concept in a representation of the
gist of the story. For example, the prime-target pair for sentences
[1] and [2] was "RAIN - GAME. " If inferential processing has
established a link between elaborated and explicit concepts, making a
decision about "RAIN" should activate the concept "GAME" in the
story's representation, thus facilitating the decision to the target
word "GAME" relative to a neutral prime. So, the idea behind this
experiment is to prime the recognition decision about a word in the
second sentence through the use of a concept that is likely to have
been elaborated. To the extent that this is possible, the elaborative
processing hypothesis receives support.
METHOD
Materials
.
Development
.
The materials used in this study were developed as
follows. First, sentences like [1] and [2] above were written such
that when paired, they related simple stories or actions with the help
of an obvious bridging inference. Next, an additional second sentence
was written which changed not only the story but also the inference
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required for the comprehension of the sentence pair as a story. For
example, with sentences [1] and [2], the likely Terence is that Jane
was uncomfortable because it was raining. Consider, however, sentence
[1] paired with a different version of sentence [2]:
[2'] Jane was sorry she had forgotten her cushion.
A pairing of sentences [1] and [2'] suggests instead that Jane's seat
was hard. Thus, each story existed in two different versions; the
reason for this will be discussed below in the Experimental Design
section. An important consideration which influenced the material
development was the availability of a reasonable prime-target word
pair for both versions of each story. The inference that a particular
story evoked had to be obvious; there had to be a focal concept that
was reliably accessed by the readers like "RAIN" or "SEAT."
Furthermore, the first sentence had to contain a noun which would be
connected to the focal concept of the inference in a representation of
the gist of the story. The focal inference concept and the noun
selected from the first sentence were used as prime-target pairs:
"There was RAIN at the GAME ," "There were hard SEATS at the GAME ."
Finally, an attempt was made to insure that any pre-existing semantic
association between the prime and target words was minimal, at best.
Twenty-five stories were written in two versions each such that they
met all of the considerations mentioned above; prime-target pairs were
designated as well.
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Validation. To validate the experimenter's intuitions about the
obviousness of the bridging inferences required to comprehend the
stories, a normative study was conducted. Twenty-six student
recruited from an undergraduate psychology course to participate in
in-class session that took about twenty minutes. Two lists of the
twenty-five two-sentence stories were constructed. The first list
contained a random order of one version of each story. The second
list presented the other version of each story in the same order. A
randomly selected half of the class received the first list while the
other half received the second. The students were told that they were
going to read a set of sentence pairs, each of which described some
sort of situation or event. They were instructed to read the
sentences carefully and then write in their own words a one or two
sentence description of what the story was about. They were warned
that the sentences they read would not be connected in an explicit
way, but that the relation between them would be obvious in most
cases; it was stressed that the experimenter was not looking for
creativity. An example story and description were provided. The
students worked through the lists of stories one at a time and in
order.
Subjects' story descriptions were examined and scored for the
presence of two things which correspond roughly to liberal and
conservative acceptability criteria: 1—The gist of the intended
inference, and 2—The use of the intended prime word in the
description of the story. For all but three of the stories, a clear
tes was
on
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majority of the subjects (eight or more out of thirteen) described the
gist of the intended inference. One of those three stori
dropped; the others were modified to make them clearer. Examinati
of the story descriptions for the presence of the prime word indicated
that the subjects tended to use the same words to describe thexr
understanding of the story. In just three cases the prime word did
not appear in the written descriptions. In these cases, however, the
subjects consistently used a synonym of the designated primes; these
synonyms were adopted instead of the original primes for use in the
experiment. Including these replacements, for 35 of the 48 story
versions, a majority of the subjects used the prime word in their
story descriptions.
The product of the development and validation procedures was a
set of 24 two-sentence stories existing in two different versions.
Each story reliably evoked a specified bridging inference, and the
prime-target pair selected for the story tapped this inference.
An additional sentence was written to be used as an introduction
for both versions of each of the twenty-four stories. These sentences
were fairly neutral and uninformative with respect to the inferences
to be drawn. To provide an example, the sentence used to introduce
the two versions of the ballpark story given above was:
[0] Jane was not enjoying the afternoon at the ballpark.
Appendix A gives a listing of both versions of each story along with
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their corresponding prime-target pairs.
^J.isj^^ Construction of the six-word lists to
accompany each story started with the placement of the prime-target
word pair in either the second and third, the third and fourth, or the
fourth and fifth word positions in the list. Eight stories each were
chosen at random for assignment to one of these three position
conditions. The nature of the filler words for the remainder of the
list was determined by consideration of how many yes ("Yes, the word
did appear in the story") and no ("Mo, the word did not appear in the
story") decisions were desired. The prime never appeared in the
story, whereas the target always did; thus, there was at least one
"Yes" and one "No" response reguired in every list of six words. Ten
stories were chosen at random to contain words reguiring three of each
kind of response (3Y-3N), five were selected to be 4Y-2N, five others
were 2Y-4M, two were 5Y-1N, and the remaining two were 1Y-5N. Care
was taken to insure that the filler words chosen to occupy word list
positions occurring before the prime-target pair were not associated
to either of the two critical words. The word lists for the two
versions of the same story differed only with respect to which word
functioned as the prime.
Story List Construction
. Before describing the preparation of
story lists for this experiment, we must first consider the baseline
RT against which facilitation was measured. The choice of baseline
here was influenced heavily by the consideration that despite
precautions, the primes could be somewhat semantically associated to
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the targets. If unaccounted for, such a condition would not permit an
unambiguous interpretation of a facilitation effect as evidence for
inferential processing. The facilitation observed could be a result
of the operation of inferential processing alone, semantic association
alone, or both at the same time. This interpretive problem was
avoided quite simply; the inferred concept prime from one version of a
story was used as the neutral prime for the other version of the same
story. Table 1 illustrates this design with the help of the ballpark
story materials. If, following version 1, "RAIN" facilitates a
decision about "GAME" because of a pre-existing semantic association,
then that facilitation will occur to the same extent in the neutral
prime condition for version 2; thus, facilitation due to semantic
association is automatically subtracted out when we look at the
difference between the two prime conditions. As a result, we are free
to interpret any facilitation observed in this experiment as a product
of inferential processing. 1
The process of story list construction started with the
preparation of two different lists of the twenty-four stories; Version
1 contained a randomly chosen version of each story, while Version 2
contained the other versions of the stories. Each version then
provided the basis for two parallel forms. Form A contained a random
assignment of the stories to either the inferred prime or neutral
prime conditions (twelve stories in each). Form B reversed this prime
condition assignment. To provide an example of the result of this
process. Table 2 shows how the ballpark story and prime-target pairs
TABLE 1
PRIMING DESIGN FOR EXPERIMENTS 1 AND 2
AS ILLUSTRATED THROUGH THE BALLPARK STORY
[0] Jane was not enjoying the afternoon at the ballpark.
[1] The situation was uncomfortable at the baseball game
Version 1 :
[2] Jane was sorry she had forgotten her umbrella.
Inferred Prime Neutral Prime
Prime: RAIN SEAT
Target: GAME GAME
Version 2 :
[2*] Jane was sorry she had forgotten her cushion.
Inferred Prime Neutral Prime
Prime: SEAT RAIN
Target: GAME GAME
41
differed for each of the four story lists. Finally, the stories were
assigned to one of four blocks in a quasi-random fashion. In each
block of six stories there were three stories from the inferred prime
and three from the neutral prime conditions. The three stories within
a prime condition represented target positions 1, 2, and 3.
Desioji. Considering Subject as a random factor, this experiment took
the form of a two (Version 1 vs. Version 2) by two (Form A vs. Form B)
by two (inferred prime vs. neutral prime) by three (word list position
1 vs. 2 vs. 3) by 24 (subjects) factorial design. Version and Form
were between-subjects variables; type of prime and word list position
were manipulated within subjects. This design was used to analyze
separately the RT data from both the primes and the targets.
Supplementary analyses were also conducted using Item as a random
factor with Subject held fixed.
Procedure
.
Participants were assigned at random to one of the four
version-by-form list conditions, and were tested individually in
sessions that lasted approximately 30 minutes. Presentation of
stories and word lists and measurement of RT was controlled by a PDP
8E microcomputer interfaced with a visual display screen. Subjects
sat in front of the screen with their hands positioned on a response
console. Response devices consisted of triggers activated by a
subject's left index finger, right index finger, and right thumb.
The series of events for each trial (i.e., a story and the
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TABLE 2
ASSIGNMENT OF BALLPARK STORY PRIME-TARGET PAIRS
TO VERSION AND FORM CONDITIONS
Version 1
Form h Form B
P£A!B§: RAIN (inferred) SEAT (neutral)
Tar9et : GAME GAME
Version 2
Form A Form B
Prime: SEAT (inferred) RAIN (neutral)
Target: GAME GAME
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corresponding word list) follows. Trials were preceded by the
question "READY?" on the screen. Subjects initiated the trial by
pressing the thumb switch; this cleared the screen and presented the
first sentence of a story. When the sentence was understood, they
pressed the thxomb switch again, replacing the first sentence of the
story with the second. They continued in this way, pressing the
switch to indicate that they had read and understood what was
currently on the screen. When they finished with the third sentence
of a story, the thumb switch press cleared the screen; after a 500
msec delay, the word list presentation began. The first word on the
list was presented in the center of the screen; subjects were told
that if the word had appeared in the story they were to pull the
response lever marked "Yes" on the response console with their right
index fingers. Otherwise, they were told to use their left index
fingers and pull the lever marked "No." Words remained on the screen
until either the subject made a decision, or until five seconds
elapsed. When a decision was made about a word, the screen was
cleared and there was a 150 msec delay before presentation of the next
word on the list in the same screen location. If, instead, there was
no response within five seconds, the screen was cleared and a 150 msec
beep occurred to alert the subject that the current word trial was
over; after another 150 msec interval, the next word was presented.
Following completion of the word list, subjects were presented with a
comprehension question on the screen for two randomly selected stories
from each block. As can be seen by examining the questions (which
44
appear along with the storxes in Appendix A), correct answers depended
on proper comprehension of the story, so these questions provided a
check to insure that subjects were reading and understanding the
stories. An intercom linked the experimenter and subject rooms, so to
answer a question, subjects merely vocalized their responses. The
experimenter then recorded whether the answers were correct or not.
Prior to the experiment, it was decided to discard data from any
subject who made errors on more than two out of eight comprehension
questions. Finally, to give the participants an indication of their
performance, after completing each set of six words, the average RT
and number of errors appeared briefly on the screen.
The subjects were instructed to read each story sentence at their
own pace, and to press the thumb switch only when they understood it.
Also, it was stressed that they should understand each set of three
sentences as a story. For the word recognition task, they were told
to respond as quickly and as accurately as possible. A copy of
instructions given to subjects appears in Appendix C.
The subjects were given a six-trial practice block of materials
that were similar to the critical set. To encourage reading for
comprehension from the outset, a comprehension question followed each
story in the practice set. Followinq the practice block, subjects
worked through the four critical blocks with short breaks in between.
Order of block presentation was random for each subject, as was the
order of story presentation within a block.
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Subjects. A total of twenty-six University of Massachusetts
undergraduates took part in this experiment. They had been recruxted
from psychology courses and received experimental credit for their
participation. Data from two subjects were discarded, one persons 's
because of an inordinately slow and error-filled performance, and
another's because of failure to meet the comprehension question
criterion of no more than two incorrect answers.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Analysis Procedures. Separate analyses were conducted on the prime
and target data. For each subject, mean reaction times were computed
for the six Position by Type of Prime condition cells, averaging over
a maximum of four items in each cell. These data were submitted to
the fixed-effect ANOVAs described above in the section on design.
Item analyses were also performed; these differ depending on whether
considering the set of 48 primes, or the set of 24 targets. The only
item analysis results that will be reported in the text will be from
tests of variables having theoretical interest: Type of Prime,
Position, and their interaction.
Additional analyses were conducted on the proportion of correct
responses for each cell. Cell proportions were calculated for each
subject; since many of these were equal to one, they were replaced
with:
Y * J = (kYij + 3/8)/(k + 3/4)
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where Yt 3 is the adjusted proportion, Ylj xs the original
proportion, and k is the number of scores on which the proportion is
based. These adjusted scores were then transformed by taking the arc
sine of the square root (Myers, 1979). The transformed scores were
then submitted to fixed-effect ANOVAs. Full results of all ANOVAs and
post hoc tests are tabled in Appendix D.
Findings for Prime Words
.
If readers are generating inferences in an
on-line fashion, then inferred concepts should be activated for some
period of time following the inferential processing. Given that the
prime words used in this experiment represent concepts that have been
activated by inferential processing, RT for those inferred (activated)
prime words should differ from that for neutral primes; specifically,
mean RT for the inferred prime condition will be larger. The
reasoning behind this prediction is based on the fact that the correct
response to a prime word encountered in the word recognition list is
"Wo." If, in fact, the concept underlying the inferred prime has been
activated, making a negative response will be difficult since the
existence of activation should set up a bias to respond "Yes."
Mean RT and error rates are shown in Table 3. Results from
analyses of variance performed on prime trial RT are shown in Tables 8
and 9 of Appendix D. Considering the data for primes, the results
indicate that inferred primes were activated during the course of
TABLE 3
MEAN REACTION TIMES (IN MSEC) AND PERCENTAGE ERRORS(IN PARENTHESES) AS A FUNCTION OF
TYPE OF PRIME AND POSITION IN EXPERIMENT 1
Primes
Type of Prime
Neut ral Inferred
Position 1 858
(1.04)
916
(10.42)
Position 2 930
(2.08)
986
(12.50)
Position 3 874
(4.17)
1094
(12.50)
Mean 887
(2.43)
999
(11.81)
Mean
887
(5.73)
958
(7.29)
984
(8.33)
943
(7.12)
Targets
Type of Prime
Neutral Inferred Mean
Position 1 818 818 818
(6.25) (2.08) (4.17)
Position 2 920 989 955
(9-38) (4.17) (6.77)
Position 3 957 917 937
(7.29) (7.29) (7.29)
Mean 898
(7.64)
908
(4.51)
903
(6.08)
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story comprehension, providing support for the claim that the subjects
were engaging in on-line inferential processing. it took the subjects
an average of 112 msec more to correctly reject inferred primes than
neutral primes <F[1,20] = 8.56, p < .01 by subjects; F[l,42] = 11.87,
2 < -01 by items). There was also a slight tendency for RT to
increase with word list position <F[2,20] = 2.77, .05 < p < .i 0 by
subjects; F < 1 by items), but this effect is entirely due to changes
in the inferred prime condition RT. As Table 3 shows, the inferred
prime RT increases from 916 to 986 msec (70 msec) from positions 1 to
2, and from 986 to 1094 (108 msec) from positions 2 to 3, while the
neutral prime RT does not change systematically. Bonferroni t-tests
(see Appendix D, Table 10) indicated that the difference between
inferred primes at Positions 1 and Position 3 was significant, and
there were no significant differences between the neutral primes.
This interaction of Position by Prime Condition is moderately
reliable: F[2,20] = 3.85, p < .05 by subjects; F[2,40] = 1.85, p >
.10 by items. The interaction can be interpreted as evidence for a
decrease in the ability of the comprehender to separate inferred
material from explicitly presented material (Kintsch, 1974),
especially when surface information has become degraded due to
intervening material, or has decayed due to time. The interaction
effect was more marked for Form A than for Form B, as indicated by a
significant Position by Prime Condition by Form interaction (F[2,40] -
7.28, p < .05).
Despite the relatively small number of errors, the results of an
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analysis of error rates (see Appendix D, Table 11) corroborate the
findings of the RT analysis. Subjects made more errors to inferred
primes than to neutral primes <F[l,20] = 20.24, p < .001), indicating
again the difficulty subjects experienced when they needed to
discriminate inferred from explicit material. This main effect of
Prime Condition was larger for Form A than for Form B, however; a test
of the Prime Condition by Form interaction yielded F[l,20] = 6.06, p <
.05, indicating again that, by chance, the strongest or best items
were in Form A. In addition to these effects, the Position by Prime
Condition by Form interaction was significant (F[2,40] = 5.49, p <
.01). As expected, the transformed error rates for the neutral prime
condition do not vary reliably across Position or Form. For the
inferred prime condition, however, two of the six points vary from the
expected pattern of increasing error rate with Position. Given the
small number of observations supporting these error analyses, it could
be the case that noise is obscuring a general Position by Prime
Condition interaction.
To summarize the analysis of the prime data, there is ample
evidence to indicate that concepts representing inferred primes are
activated during the comprehension process. When asked to make a word
recognition decision for inferred prime words, subjects were slower
and less accurate as compared with neutral prime words. Furthermore,
the later in the word list this decision was made, the worse their
performance became. This result suggests that, in addition to being
activated, inferred concepts are added to a text representation soon
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after they are generated; a reader guxckly begins to lose the ability
to differentiate inferred from explicitly-presented material.
It is possible, however, to consider an alternative to the
explanations offered here for the prime trial data. It would claim
that subjects were not generating inferences during comprehension but
rather were either generating them at the time of test, or simply
performing some sort of plausibility check at the time of test. This
behavior would lead to the observed RT difference between neutral and
inferred primes. As a model of performance in this task it seems
unlikely on logical grounds, however, since 100% of the trials in this
experiment require inferential processing. Even if subjects started
the experiment by deferring the processing necessary to perform the
word recognition task until the test, it would certainly be in the
their interest to evolve a strategy of generating inferences on-line.
Since they were reading at their own rates, they could easily have
done this. A more direct argument against the alternative explanation
comes from the data of Experiments 3 and 4 to be presented later which
support the on-line inference generation position.
Findings for Target Words
. Results from the statistical analyses
performed on target word RT are shown in Tables 12, 13, and 14 of
Appendix D. Reviewing the prediction for these items, it was expected
that RT to targets preceded by inferred words would be faster as
compared with targets preceded by neutral words. The results do not
support this prediction. As shown in Table 3, mean RT was actually
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slower (898 msec vs. 908 msec), though not significantly so, to
targets primed by inferred words (F < 1 by subjects and items). There
were moderately reliable differences between the means for Position
(F[2,40] = 3.90, E < .05 by subjects; F[2,20] = 1.68, p > .10 by
items). Bonferroni t-tests indicated that subjects responded the
fastest to targets in Position 1; mean RTs for Positions 2 and 3 were
not significantly different.
The ANOVA performed on target error rates (Appendix D, Table 15)
yielded two results; there was a significant Position by Version
interaction, and a marginal Position by Version by Form interaction.
These effects are of little theoretical interest and will not be
discussed further.
To summarize the findings for target words, contrary to
expectation, there was no evidence in either the RT or error rate data
to indicate that inferred concepts can be used to prime word
recognition decisions to explicitly-presented words.
General Summary
.
Having found surprisingly strong effects of Type of
Prime on prime RTs, the failure of this experiment to demonstrate a
priming effect was rather puzzling. In order to give the elaborative
processing hypothesis as fair a test as possible, the first attempt to
understand the negative result with target words was directed at
methodology. In the next chapter, an experiment will be presented
which used the same materials with a change in procedure.
CHAPTER
EXPERIMENT 2
Consider the word recognition procedure used in Experiment 1.
Subjects worked through a list of six words with a 150 msec interval
between a response and the presentation of the next word. Words used
as primes were never used in the stories, so the correct response to
them was "Mo." As the data from the last experiment show, in the case
of inferred primes this was a difficult decision to make. If the
difficulty of this decision carried over in some way beyond the
response, it could adversely affect RT to the target words that
followed. The suggestion here is that the 150 msec interval may not
have been long enough for the subjects to completely terminate
processing on the difficult inferred-prime trials. It could be the
case that target words were, in fact, primed by inferred words, but
that the priming effect was masked by interference from the priming
trial; the processing of target words that followed inferred words may
have started later than that of target words that followed neutral
words
.
To check this possibility, Experiment 2 used the same materials
with a different procedure. Instead of using trial-to-trial priming
embedded in a list of words, in this experiment the prime word was
presented as a single word cue that the subjects merely had to read.
Following a variable stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA), subjects
performed a word recognition decision on the target word. Since no
52
53
decision is made to prime words, there should be no "cognitive
processing carry over" to delay target word processing in the inferred
prime condition. The prediction for this experiment is the same as
before: RT to targets that are cued by inferred words should be
faster than that for target words cued by neutral words.
METHOD
Materials. The 24 stories used in Experiment 1 were used as critical
stimuli in this experiment with one exception; one of them was
replaced (noted in Appendix A). In addition, 48 more stories similar
in structure to the critical ones were written to be used as filler.
Prime-target word pairs were chosen for these such that 12 had old
targets and 36 had new targets; thus, over the whole stimulus set of
72 stories, old and new targets were equally probable. Since only one
recognition stimulus was needed for each story, there was no need to
include the leading vague sentence that had served as a source of
recognition stimuli for the six-word lists in the previous
experiment. Only the critical sentence pair, the second and third
sentence of each story, was used for this experiment. The critical
stories were assigned to the same List and Form conditions reported in
Experiment 1.
Design
.
As for Experiment 1, the between-subjects variables for this
experiment were Version and Form. SOA was manipulated within each
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subject at two levels (250 msec vs. 750 msec). Thus, considering the
Subject factor random, and averaging over xtems, the desxgn is a two
(Version) by two (Form) by two (Type of Prime) by two (SOA) mixed
factorial ANOVA. Additional analyses were carried out with the Item
factor random and with Subject held fixed.
Procedure
.
Participants were assigned at random to one of the four
version-by-form conditions, and were tested individually in sessions
that lasted approximately 30 minutes. The display eguipment and
response console were the same as that used in the previous experiment.
The series of events for each trial follows. The stories were
presented to and read by the subjects in the same way as Experiment 1;
sentences were read individually at each subject's own pace. A 500
msec delay followed the subjects' indication that the second (and
last) story sentence had been read. A visual cue, a set of three X's,
was then displayed for 500 msec in the center of the screen to capture
the subjects* attention. Following this, the prime word replaced the
cue and stayed on the screen for either 250 or 750 msec. Subjects
were asked merely to read the prime silently. As soon as the prime
was erased from the screen, the target word was presented in the
center of the screen, one line lower than where the prime had been.
Subjects then had up to five seconds to make a word recognition
decision; they were asked to respond as guickly and as accurately as
possible.
The materials were presented in six blocks of twelve stories
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each. The presentation order of the blocks and the stories within
each block was random for each subject. To help insure that the
materials were being read for comprehension, questions were asked
after the word recognition task for four stones from each block. A
copy of instructions given to subjects appears in Appendix C.
Subjects. A total of twenty University of Massachusetts
undergraduates took part in this experiment. They had been recruited
from psychology courses and received experimental credit for their
participation. All subjects met the criterion of no more than two
comprehension question errors.
RESULTS AMD DISCUSS ION
Analysis Procedures. For each subject, mean reaction times were
computed for the four SOA by Type of Prime cells, averaging over a
maximum of six items in each cell. These data were submitted to a
fixed-effect ANOVA. An Item analysis was also performed, and complete
ANOVA tables for both analyses are given in Tables 16 and 17 of
Appendix D.
Findings
.
Mean RT and error rates are shown in Table 4. These data
do not support the prediction of the elaborative processing
hypothesis. Rather, at both SOAs, targets primed by inferred word
cues were actually responded to more slowly than those primed by
TABLE 4
REACTION TIMES (IN MSEC) AND PERCENTAGE ERRORS(IN PARENTHESES) AS A FUNCTION OF
TYPE OF PRIME AND SOA IN EXPERIMENT 2
Type of Prime
Neutral Inferred Mean
250 ms ec 1117 H83 H5o
(7.50) (8.33) (7.92)
750 msec 1135 1154 i 145
(6.67) (6.67) (6.67)
Mean H26 1169 1148
(7.08) (7.50) (7.29)
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neutral cues. However, neither the main effects of Type of Pri.e or
SOA, nor their interaction were significant (see Tables 16 and 17 in
Appendix D for results of the analyses of variance). One source of
variance, the Form by Version interaction, did achieve significance:
Form A items were responded to more slowly when presented in Version 1
than in Version 2, while the opposite was true of Form B items
(P[l,16j s 5.33, g < .05). There was also a trend for items presented
at the 250 msec SOA to be responded to more slowly than those at 750
msec for Form A, while the reverse was true for Form B; this resulted
in a marginally significant SOA by Form interaction <F[1,16] = 4.17,
.05 < p < .10).
Inspection of the error data presented in Table 4 shows that
subjects made, on the average, 1.75 errors out of the twenty-four
critical trials (an error rate of 7.29 percent), and there were no
systematic trends with respect to experimental conditions.
Summary. Given the results of this experiment, the "cognitive carry
over" explanation does not account for the failure of Experiment 1 to
show a priming effect. In the next chapter, an experiment will be
described which provides a further attempt to address the guestion of
integration of inferred and explicit material. The logic behind the
next experiment remains the same, but the materials and paradigm were
changed.
CHAPTER IV
EXPERIMENT 3
The results of Experiment 1 do not support the assumption that
inferred propositions are added to a discourse representation during
comprehension. In Experiment 2, similar results were obtained with a
slightly modified experimental procedure. To check on the hypothesis
further, for the next two experiments a new set of materials was
developed, and a different experimental task was used.
The motivation for a change of materials came from the concern
that either: 1—previous stories do not facilitate the connection of
inferred and explicitly-presented propositions; or, 2—that such
connections are set up, but that the prime-target pairs used in the
studies did not tap them. The stories written for Experiment 3
consisted of two sentences written around a category-exemplar word
pair. For example:
[3] The ship was cruising along on the calm sea.
[4] Suddenly it dived under water until only its periscope was
visible.
A reader of this story would probably infer that the ship mentioned in
the first sentence was a submarine. Thus, with this type of story,
stories based on category-exemplar pairs, it is likely that an
inference will bridge the gap between a category name mentioned in the
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first sentence, and the specific member alluded to in the second
sentence. Thus, the prime-target word pair for this story is
SHIP-SUBMARINE. Note that the order of priming for this experiment is
from explicit concept to inferred concept, which is the reverse of
that used in Experiments 1 and 2. Perhaps the null results obtained
so far are caused by low path accessibility when using an inferred
concept as a starting point for priming. If this is the case, the
priming effect that has not been obtained previously may appear.
The experimental situation for this study is similar to that of
Experiment 2 in that subjects read two-sentence stories and saw a
single word prime, but the task was changed from target word
recognition to target word naming. The naming task has been used
freguently in experiments on priming of semantic memory (e.g., Lorch,
Note 4; Becker & Killion, 1977; Warren, 1977) and has proven to be a
useful way of detecting activation of memory structures; it has the
added guality of being an error-free, low variability task. Another
advantage is that no materials need to be sacrificed to provide catch
trials. The major reason for the change, though, was that word
recognition is more likely to be affected by conscious subject
strategies since it is a forced-choice task. Subjects generally
perform the naming task without realizing that they are being timed;
when comprehension guest ions are asked after each trial (as was the
case with this experiment), they perceive guestion answering as their
primary task.
The logic of this experiment is illustrated in Table 5 which
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shows the priming design. There were three conditions in this
experiment. In the first two conditions, subjects saw the inferred
category exemplar as the target word for naming, but the prime was
either "positive," (the category name), or "neutral" (the word
"BLANK"). m the last condition, subjects received the intact
positive prime-target pair after a story that was not about that
pair. Although the target words were low dominant category exemplars,
and thus the semantic association between them and the category names
minimized, there might still be some facilitation of the naming
response to them when using the category name as a prime. Therefore,
facilitation relative to the neutral prime condition could represent
either semantic association, inferential processing, or both. For
this reason, the non-inferred positive prime condition was included in
the experiment. If the naming latency to "SUBMARINE" following "SHIP"
in the inferred target condition is not faster than in the
non-inferred target condition, there has been no activation of the
concept "SUBMARINE" due to inferential processing. If, however, the
latency is smaller when the target has followed a story in which it
has been implicitly included (the inferred target condition), then it
has been activated through inferential processing, and the
facilitation effect due to this processing is reflected via reference
to the neutral prime condition.
TABLE 5
PRIMING DESIGN FOR EXPERIMENTS 3 AND 4
INFERRED TARGET CONDITION
[3] The ship was cruising along the calm sea.
[4] Suddenly it dived until only its periscope was visible,
Positive Prime
Prime: SHIP
Target: SUBMARINE
Neutral Prime
BLANK
SUBMARINE
NON-INFERRED TARGET CONDITION
[5] In a fit of rage, the angry animal turned and charged.
[6] The crowd cheered as the matador deftly avoided the rush,
Prime
:
Target
Positive Prime
SHIP
SUBMARINE
Neutral Prime *
BLANK
SUBMARINE
*Not included in Experiment 3.
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METHOD
Materials
.
Development
.
Forty-five low dominant exemplars were chosen from
the Battig and Montague (1969) and Shapiro and Palermo (1970) category
norms. The categories chosen were fairly common and could be labeled
with a single word like "ship,- "animal," or "planet." Low dominant
exemplars were purposely chosen so that the pre-existing semantic
association between them and their respective category names would be
minimized.
For each category-exemplar pair a two-sentence story was written
such that the first sentence used the category name to describe an
unspecified exemplar, and the second sentence provided enough
information for the reader to infer which specific exemplar was being
described. The category name served as a prime while the exemplar
name served as a target. Finally, a comprehension guestion was
written for each story. To answer a guestion correctly, a subject
would have had to make the correct inference. The stories,
prime-target word pairs, and comprehension guestions for the set of 45
critical trials are given in Appendix B. Seventy-five other stories,
similar in sentence structure to the 45 critical stories, were written
to serve as filler. The prime-target word pairs selected for the
filler stories did not have category-exemplar relationships.
Story List Construction
. Each of the 45 stories was randomly
assigned to one of three subsets; the subsets corresponded to the
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three conditions in the experiment. Two more lists of stories were
generated so that each subset could be represented under each
condition. Thus, given the same number of subjects in each list
condition, each story appeared with the three types of prime-target
pairs an equal number of times.
Design. Considering Subject as a random factor, this experiment has
the form of a three (Lists; between subjects) by three (Conditions;
within subjects) factorial ANOVA. An ANOVA in which Item was
considered random with the Subject factor fixed was also performed.
Procedure
.
Participants were assigned at random to one of the three
list conditions, and were tested individually in sessions that lasted
approximately one hour. In addition to the equipment described
previously for stimulus presentation and response recording, a voice
key was used to help record naming latencies. It was interfaced with
the PDP 8E, and was set to react to the leading edge of the subjects'
responses; naming latency, then, was defined as the time from target
onset to the beginning of the articulation of a response by the
subject.
The series of events for each trial was as follows. Stories were
presented in the same manner as described for Experiments 1 and 2; the
pair of sentences was read individually at each subject's own pace,
and it was stressed that the sentence pair should be understood as a
story. A 500 msec delay followed the subjects' indication that the
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second sentence had been read. A visual cue consisting of three X's
was then displayed for 500 .sec in the center of the screen to capture
the subjects' attention. Following this, the prime word replaced the
cue and stayed on the screen for 250 msec. Subjects were asked to
read the prime silently. As soon as the prime was erased, the target
word was presented in the center of the screen, one line lower than
where the prime had been. The subjects were instructed to read the
target out loud as quickly as possible. If the voice key registered
the response correctly, the screen was cleared and then a
comprehension question about the story appeared; if no response had
been registered by 2.5 seconds, the words "TRIAL OVER" appeared
briefly on the screen before the question was presented. Subjects
were asked to answer the question out loud, and the experimenter
recorded whether or not the answer was correct. A copy of
instructions given to subjects appears in Appendix C.
The experimenter monitored the naming responses as a check to
insure that the voice key had been activated by the subject's voice
articulating the correct response. If the word was misread, or if
there had been a voice key failure (premature or late activation),
then the experimenter was able to delete the data from that trial
before the next story was presented.
After a six-trial practice block, the materials were presented in
five blocks of 24 stories each. Each block contained 15 filler and 9
critical trials distributed evenly across the three experimental
conditions. The presentation order of blocks and stories within blocks
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was random for each subject.
Subjects. Twenty-seven University of Massachusetts undergraduates
(nine per list condition) took part in this experiment. They had been
recruited from psychology courses and received experimental credxt for
their participation.
RESULTS AMD DISCUSSION
Analysis Procedures
.
For each subject, mean naming latencies were
computed for the three condition cells, averaging over a maximum of 15
observations per cell. These data were submitted to a fixed-effect
ANOVA. An Item analysis was also performed, and the results of these
analyses are given in Tables 18 and 19 of Appendix D.
Findings. Mean naming latency and error rates are shown in Table 6.
The error rates reflect voice key failure almost exclusively, and are
guite low overall (1.23%); thus, error rate will not be discussed
further. The mean Condition latencies in Table 6 are consistent with
prior expectation. Target words were named faster when they
represented inferred concepts. The variability between the three
means was significant over Subjects (F[2,48] = 20.47, p < .01), but
not over Items (F[2,4] = 2.58, p > .10). Two planned Bonferroni
t-tests were conducted for pairwise comparison of conditions (see
Appendix D, Table 20). These tests showed a significant difference
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TABLE 6
MEAN NAMING LATENCY (IN MSEC) AND PERCENTAGE ERRORS(IN PARENTHESES) AS A FUNCTION OF
CONDITION IN EXPERIMENT 3
Inferred Target Non-Inferred Target
Positive Neutral Positive
520 533
(0.49) (1.98) (1.23)
Mean
572 542
(1.23)
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between the Inferred Target, Positive Prime (520 msec) and
Non-Inferred, Positive Prime (572 msec) conditions, and also a
significant difference between the Inferred, Positive Prime (520 msec)
and Inferred, Neutral Prime (533 msec) conditions.
Summary This experiment has accomplished several objectives. It has
demonstrated an inference effect with a new set of materials and with
the naming task, and therefore extends the generality of the finding
of Experiment 1 that inferred concepts are activated during the course
of comprehension. Furthermore, the difference between positively and
neutrally primed targets in the inferred target condition is
suggestive of a facilitation effect due to the existence of a link in
memory between the category name and the inferred target. Mo
conclusions about this effect can be drawn at this point since there
is no baseline against which to judge it. The facilitation could
merely reflect semantic association or it could reflect the existence
of a new link (or the strengthening of the old) due to inferential
processing. Experiment 4 contains an appropriate baseline and will
address this issue.
The view given above takes the position that the difference
between the latency to inferred and non-inferred targets reflects the
activation of the inferred targets via on-line inferential
processing. An alternative explanation of the current set of data
takes a different view; specifically, instead of reflecting the
activation of inferred targets, the difference merely reflects
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interference „ith the non-inferred targets. It might be argued that
the subjects learn to develop a conscious expectation for seeing
inferred concepts for naming; crossing up this expectation, as would
be the case with non-inferred targets, would lead to increased naming
latency (Neely, 1977). It would be hard to justify this line of
reasoning for the current situation, however, because it is not likely
that such a conscious expectation would develop. While it is true
that 67 percent of the critical trials require the naming of inferred
targets, the filler trials do not use inferred concepts as targets.
Instead, they use words that have appeared in the sentences, words
associated to words in the sentences, or unrelated words. Adjusting
for the filler trials, then, 42 percent of all naming stimuli come
from the sentences or are associates, 33 percent are unrelated words,
and only 25 percent represent inferred concepts. In addition, as
mentioned earlier, subjects tended not to assign any importance to the
naming task in this experiment, and so were probably not engaging in
any strategies for accomplishing it.
CHAPTER V
EXPERIMENT 4
Experiment 3 has demonstrated that information needed for
inference building is activated during comprehension. Experiment 4 is
an extension of the previous experiment aimed at determining if this
activated inferred information becomes integrated with the explicit
story information. In addition to the three conditions used in
Experiment 3, Experiment 4 included a non-inferred target, neutral
prime condition (see Table 5). The logic of this experiment follows.
The 13 msec priming effect obtained in the last experiment may have
been due to pre-existing semantic association only (although the
target words had been chosen to minimize this association). If that
was the case, then in this experiment the difference between the
neutral and positive prime conditions should not differ across
inference conditions; the facilitation effect will be as large when
the target word represents an inferred concept as when it does not.
Next, consider the elaborative processing view. This position would
claim that the inferred concepts are integrated on-line with the
explicit text concepts, meaning that inferred concept-explicit concept
connections are formed during comprehension. These connections would
allow for the priming of, for example, "SUBMARINE" from "SHIP" through
some bridging inference like "The ship mentioned in the story was a
submarine." The prediction based on this view, then, is that there
should be facilitation for the inferred target condition, but less or
69
70
no facilitation in the non-inferred target condition (there could be
some facilitation due to the weak association in semantic memory).
METHOD
Materials
.
Development
.
The materials written for Experiment 3 were used in
this experiment. An additional eight stories, prime-target pairs, and
comprehension questions were prepared for this study (three critical
and five filler) to make a total of 48 critical trials and 80 filler
trials. The three new critical stories, prime-target pairs, and
questions appear at the end of Appendix B.
Story List Construction. Each of the 48 stories was randomly
assigned to one of four subsets corresponding to the four conditions
in the experiment. Three more lists of stories were generated so that
each subset would be assigned to each condition. Thus, given the same
number of subjects in each list condition, every story appeared with
the four types of prime target pairs an equal number of times.
Design
.
Considering subject as a random factor, this experiment has
the form of a four (Lists; between subjects) by two (Inference
Condition; within subjects) by two (Type of Prime; within subjects)
factorial ANOVA. An ANOVA with Item random and Subject fixed was also
performed.
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Procedure. Participants were assigned at rando, to one of the four
list conditions, and were tested individually i„ sessions that lasted
approximately one hour. The equipment and procedure was identical to
that reported for Experiment 3. The instructions given to subjects
were identical to those given for Experiment 3 (appearing in Appendix
C) except for the number of trials cited.
After the practice block, the materials were presented in four
blocks of 32 trials each. Each block contained 12 critical trials and
20 filler trials distributed evenly across the four experimental
conditions. The presentation order of blocks and trials within blocks
was random for each subject.
Subjects
.
Twenty University of Massachusetts undergraduates (five per
list condition) took part in this experiment. They had been recruited
from psychology courses and received either experimental credit or
five dollars for their participation.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Analysis Procedures
.
For each subject, mean naming latencies were
computed for the four condition cells, averaging over a maximum of 12
observations per cell. These data were submitted to a fixed-effect
ANOVA. An Item analysis was also performed, and results from these
analyses of variance are given in Tables 21 and 22 in Appendix D.
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Finding. Mean naming latencies and error rates shQra ^ iabi<
7. Once again error rate was low. averaging 1.15 percent over al!
critical trials in the experiment. and it will not be considered
further.
Consistent with the previous experiment's data is the result that
inferred targets were named considerably faster than non-inferred
targets (521 msec vs. 574 msec). This 53 msec inference effect was
significant by subjects <F[1,16]=40.55, p <.001), and marginally
significant by items <P[1,3]=5.83,
.05 < p < .10). Also consistent
with the previous experiment was the existence of a difference between
neutrally and positively primed targets (552 msec vs. 542 msec);
although small, this 10 msec facilitation effect, represented by the
main effect of Type of Prime, was significant by subjects (F[l,16] =
4.89, p < .05) but not by items (F < 1). it is surprising to note,
however, that the facilitation effect is due mostly to the
non-inferred target condition, which shows an 18 msec effect as
compared with the inferred condition, which shows only a 2 msec
effect. Although this apparent interaction of Inference Condition and
Type of Prime was not significant (F[l,16] = 2.13, p > .10 by
subjects; F < 1 by items), planned Bonferroni t-tests (see Appendix D,
Table 23) indicated that the 18 msec facilitation effect for
non-inferred targets was significant while the 2 msec effect for the
inferred targets was not.
A final significant result to mention is the Type of Prime by
List interaction in the subjects ANOVA (F[3,16] = 3.80, p < .05).
TABLE 7
MEAN NAMING LATENCIES (IN MSEC) AND PERCENTAGE ERRORS(IN PARENTHESES) AS A FUNCTION OF
INFERENCE CONDITION AND TYPE OF PRIME IN EXPERIMENT 4
Type of Prime
Positive Neutral Mean
Inferred Targets 520
(1.25)
522
(1.25)
521
(1.25)
Non-Inferred Targets 565
( .83)
583
(1.25)
574
(1.04)
Mean 542
(1.04)
552
(1.25)
547
(1.15)
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inspection of the data reveals the source of the interacts; foe
three of the four lists of materials, subjects showed an overall
facilitation effect averaging about 19 msec in magnitude. For the
remaining list, however, this trend was reversed by a 16 msec
interference effect.
Summary.. Thls data set fails to provide support for the claim of
on-line integration of inferred and explicit information. Once again,
however, the issue is clouded by uncertainties. Why was there no
facilitation effect for inferred targets? This is an important
question to answer since, if some aspect of the experiment's
methodology artificially reduced the effect, then the study was biased
against the elaborative processing hypothesis at the start. The data
do not give any sure answer to the question, but the following
possibility suggests itself. The smallest mean latency in both
Experiments 3 and 4 was that for the positively primed inferred
targets which both had a value of 520 msec. Could this value
represent a performance ceiling? Perhaps inferred targets are so
highly activated already (and the size of the inference effect
testifies to this degree of activation) that the additional benefit of
having been primed is small in comparison. While this explanation
does not address the facilitation effect discrepancy between the two
experiments, it does provide an account of why there is no inferred
target priming effect in the current data set. Ways of dealing with
the ceiling effect will be considered in the next chapter.
CHAPTER VI
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Summary of Dissertation Motivation anrf Findings
Cognitive scientists have attached much theoretical importance to
the concept of elaboration and its role in text processing and
memory. The two key aspects of the commonly accepted
conceptualization of elaboration are: Elaborations are generated
during the encoding of text, and they are integrated with explicitly
asserted information in the text representation as part of the ongoing
comprehension process. Inference, a specific type of elaboration, was
the object of study for this dissertation.
Studies from within the recall/recognition memory, reading time,
and sentence verification paradigms have reported evidence in support
of the on-line elaborative processing hypothesis. These paradigms,
however, have been shown to be inadequate for the purpose. The
priming literature on inference was mostly concerned with forward, or
non-necessary, inferences, and it was divided with respect to the
issues of on-line generation and storage. Therefore, there is little
evidence that backward inferences, those needed to maintain text
coherence, are generated and stored on-line, although most researchers
have reasoned on an intuitive basis that this is so. To provide data
relevant to the on-line elaborative processing hypothesis, four
experiments were designed and executed.
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The priming data of Experiment 1 indicated that concepts which
are likely to be used in the construction of an inferential bridge are
activated during the comprehension process. Subjects' performances
were characterized by a marked difficulty in discriminating inferred
concepts from explicitly asserted ones. Interestingly, this
difficulty increased as the time between comprehension and test
increased; the implication is that the subjects were rapidly losing
the ability to discriminate inferred and explicit material. The
target data from this experiment, however, failed to support the
notion that inferred concepts are integrated with the explicit
material during comprehension. This failure was not caused by the
peculiarities of the list priming procedure; the single word priming
of Experiment 2 also failed to provide evidence for a connection
between the activated inferred concepts and selected explicit concepts.
Experiments 3 and 4 demonstrated that the finding of inferred
concept activation is robust; it was replicated with a different style
of materials and a different task. Once again, though, the results
from these two experiments do not support the hypothesis of inference
integration during comprehension.
In the remainder of this chapter, I will discuss these results
from two different perspectives. First, I will consider the
possibility that inferences are integrated during comprehension, but
that the methodology failed in its attempt to demonstrate this.
Second, alternative conceptualizations of the inference process that
are consistent with the data presented here will be discussed. A
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final section will reconsider the notion of necessity with respect to
the drawing of inferences.
Methodological Issues
Development of Materials
.
Prime-Target Word Pair Selection
. The two basic sets of stories
used in these experiments succeeded to the extent that concepts
involved in inference structures were activated. Evidence for the
existence of inference integration rested, however, on finding
connections between those concepts and asserted ones. Data on these
connections were obtained via assessments of priming effects between
inferred and explicit concepts. The tenuous part of the materials
development enterprise for Experiments 1 and 2 was in trying to decide
on an a priori basis where the inferred material would be linked to
the asserted text representation. The rule of thumb used for the
first two experiments was to write stories that contained a noun which
seemed likely to be connected to the inference concept in a
representation of the gist of the story. For some stories, like the
one about the person who wished she had an umbrella at the game, or
the one about a violent disturbance at a prison, this strategy seemed
appropriate: "There was RAIN at the GAME , " or "There was a RIOT at
the PRISON "
.
For others, the location of a likely connection between
the inference and the text was less certain (see Appendix A).
McKoon and Ratcliff's (1981) study included experiments on the
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connection of implied xnstruments and asserted concepts. The xssue of
concept connection is consxderably easxer to deal with in the limited
domain of xnstrument inference, however. For every implxed instrument
there is an asserted action and object. So, for a sentence like "He
swept the floor," Ratcliff and McKoon took the posxtion that "BROOM"
should be connected with (and prime) concepts in the proposition
contaxning "FLOOR.
"
(There xs a possible problem with this situation,
however, and I will return to the McKoon and Ratcliff experiments
shortly.) Backward inference stories are not as easy to characterize,
unfortunately. That inferences are necessary and are drawn seems
certain; the manner of xntegration of those inferences with the text
is not altogether clear. This uncertainty is xndicative of our lack
of information about the use of world knowledge in maintaining text
coherence. Thus far we have been able to only guess about how
information retrieved from semantic memory is added to a text base.
For these reasons, it seems that it is important to write stories
that will require small, very well defined backward inferences. This
was attempted in Experiments 3 and 4. There was a clear procedure for
the writing of the materials for these studies. The first member of
each sentence pair named a semantic category; the second was written
in such a way as to describe a member of that category. With stories
written to require only small inferential bridges, we should be more
able to pinpoint the location of connections between those bridges and
specific concepts in the text.
Length of Stories
. For all of the studies presented here, the
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materials consisted of two or three-sentence stories. These are
rather short considering the size of most narratives. Their use
seemed justified. however, in u,ht of the fact that many
comprehensible but inferencerequiring communications are as short.
Furthermore, they were understood easily in the experimental context,
as evidenced by subjects' ability to answer the comprehension
questions
.
It must be noted, however, that stories used by other researchers
have been longer. McKoon and Ratcliff'a (1981) stories, for example,
consisted of four sentences. In contrast, Dosher and Corbett (1982)
presented only a single sentence. As Dosher and Corbett suggest, this
is one possible reason for the two studies' conflicting results, and
it may have been a factor in my experiments as well. There is no
compelling explanation for why passage length should be important for
inference processing, though. Dosher and Corbett (1982) offer the
possibility that activation of sentence concepts is somehow different
when subjects read full paragraphs, but they do not explain why or how
this is so.
One possibility is that longer stories allow subjects to develop
macrostructures or schemata which facilitate the integration of
inferred material. Presumably, sentence pairs do not allow this to
the same extent (Miller & Kintsch, 1980). So, although an inference
may be generated, if the story is impoverished to begin with, there is
very little integration possible. The text would be represented more
like a set of isolated facts used in studies of propositional fan
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(e.g., Reder & Anderson, 1980) than an elaborated network.
Experiment Procedures
.
Ceiling^Mfects. The activation ceiling effect problem was
mentioned in the discussion of Experiment 4. The problem is that the
inferred-concept targets used in the experiment may have been hxghly
activated by inference processing before they were primed for naming.
Thus, even if the explicit-concept prime was connected with the
inferred concept in the text representation, priming the naming of
inferred targets would not improve performance.
The usual procedure for dealing with ceiling effects is to do
something to slow down the subjects' performance in the task. One way
of doing this would be to degrade the video display during the naming
trials, either by the introduction of "visual noise," or by reducing
the screen contrast. As has been reported (Becker & Killion, 1977;
Meyer, Schvanaveldt
, & Ruddy, 1974), display degradation tends to
enhance priming effects. Prior to running this experiment, screen
contrast reduction was considered as a way of increasing the priming
effects, but it was not feasible; subjects would have experienced
considerable eye strain because in addition to reading naming stimuli,
they were reading a large amount of text as well.
Another way to slow subjects' performance is to introduce a delay
for each trial between reading the story and the naming task. This
would allow time for the activation that has accrued on the inferred
concept due to inferential processing to decay. Mow, any activation
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due to priming via connections in the text representation would be
noticeable. Unfortunately, this latter strategy is somewhat at odds
with the overall concern of this dissertation-to assess whether
connections are formed during comprehension. Employing a delay
between text processing and test may only leave the question open.
Perhaps, though, introducing a functional delay through the addition
of an ending sentence or two would allow the overall activation level
to drop while keeping the subject busy until test. This would do away
with the ceiling problem without seriously compromising the claim that
effects reflect integration processes at encoding. McKoon and
Ratcliff (1981) used a similar approach by having subjects read two
stories consecutively before encountering test stimuli. They did not
explain why they used that procedure, however, so their motivation in
doing so is uncertain.
Summary of Methodological Issues
. Several aspects of the methods used
in these experiments may have contributed to the null results with
respect to inference integration. In particular, the prime-target
stimulus selection, story length, and priming procedures may all have
biased these studies against the integration hypothesis. In each
case, an alteration with justification was offered for the purpose of
removing the biases. In the next section of this chapter, I will
change my perspective and consider some alternative conceptualizations
of inference.
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Alternative Conceptualizat
i
ons
^-^^^ There are two related conceptual-
izations of inference processing that I would like to suggest. They
are based on two distinctions that require consideration before the
specific hypotheses can be presented.
Inference Activation/Inference Integration. This is essentially
the same distinction presented by McKoon and Ratcliff (1980b; 1981) in
their model of inference. Inference activation refers to the process
of searching for and activating information that will be incorporated
in an inferential structure. It is usually what is meant by the
phrase "inference generation." As would be expected, the activation
of concepts involved in the inferential structure is subject to decay
after time or intervening cognitive activity.
Inference integration refers to the connection of the activated
inferential structure with the text representation. When this has
occurred, we generally say that the inference has been "stored." 2
Text comprehension/Text integration
. Even though the term
"comprehension" usually implies the immediate construction of an
integrated network representation of a text (e.g., see Smith, 1981), I
would like to suggest a different view. For the hypotheses considered
in this section, comprehension refers to a process that occurs during
the reading of a text. Its function is to monitor and maintain text
coherence on a momentary basis. Seen in this way, comprehension is
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concerned with only the immediately preceding and current sentences or
phrases, so its text focus is quite narrow. This view of
comprehension is very much like the processing assumed by Kintsch and
van Dijk (1978) to occur on propositions stored in the "active
buffer." It is a high priority process since the maintenance of text
coherence is considered to be of primary importance.
In contrast, integration refers to the building of an integrated
network which represents the text. If any backward inferences have
been activated, it is presumed that these are part of the active
buffer since they are needed to maintain text coherence. They
function as a kind of temporary propositional "glue" to support the
development of coherence. They are, therefore, candidates for
inclusion in the text representation. Thus, inference integration is
just a part of the overall integration process.
In contrast with the processes involved in comprehension,
integration has a wide text focus; the entire text base should be
available for integrative processing. Furthermore, instead of being
an ongoing process, integration may take place at discrete points
during the reading of a text (Just & Carpenter, 1980), so it is a
"batch" rather that on-line process; because of its global nature, it
should require more cognitive resources than comprehension.
Since the data I have presented suggest that inferences are
activated during comprehension, the hypotheses to follow are mostly
concerned with integration. If we rule out the possibility that
inferences are integrated on-line, there are two hypotheses about
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inference integration: It could simply lag behind in£erence
activation by some amount of time, or it could be neglected
altogether.
Il^enc^nt^v^n Lag Hypothesis. Perhaps the integration process
which has been presumed to exist for inferences requires more time for
completion that was allowed by the experimental procedures. It also
may be the case that if processing demands at a given point in time
are high, integration may be deferred. Since it is assumed that
comprehension processing has greater priority, this deferral may occur
fairly often during the reading of difficult material. If inference
integration is deferred for too long a period of time, the activation
of the inferential structure may fade away. The inference would then
have no chance of being integrated and stored with the
explicitly-asserted text.
Consider again the results from Experiment 1. Word recognition
decisions for inferred concepts became more difficult with delay,
indicating that subjects were losing the ability to discriminate
inferred and explicit material. This seems to suggest that an
integration process is underway; it is not nearly complete, however,
since subjects were able to perform the discrimination at even the
longest delay quite well (they were still at 87 percent accuracy).
Recall that the delay variable was weak, though; the longest delay
between comprehension of the last sentence and presentation of the
prime word for recognition was only about five seconds, and that
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interval was filled almost entirely with other word recognxti
decisions. Making the stories longer, perhaps by including one
more simple closing sentences, might allow the integration of inferred
and explicitly-asserted information to be completed.
This explanation is consistent with students' common observation
that lectures seem perfectly understandable while they are in
progress, but understanding diminishes to a frighteningly small amount
just a few hours later. The explanation for this phenomenon in terms
of the lag hypothesis would be as follows. During the lecture,
comprehension processes are providing checks that coherence is being
maintained, with the focus on only the most recent input. Inferences
are being generated to aid comprehension, but before they can be
integrated with the explicitly-asserted material, new information
comes in for comprehension, taking away resources from the integration
processing. The student's experience at the time is that
comprehension is good (a valid impression), but the unfortunate truth
is that the stored representation is an impoverished unelaborated
network. Later, their recall of the material is poor. (Poorer recall
for unintegrated material has been demonstrated by Myers et al.; Mote
2.)
Regeneration Hypothesis . This hypothesis is similar to the
integration lag idea in that it assumes inferences are activated
during comprehension, and that inference integration does not
necessarily follow. While the integration lag hypothesis claims that
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inference integration occurs when it can. the regeneration hypothesis
assu.es instead that inferences are never integrated. instead,
inferences can be regenerated whenever necessary by using the
explicitly-asserted material stored in the text representation. The
notion here is that inference activation may require less effort than
integrative processing, so inferences are not added to the text
representation.
A problem for the regeneration hypothesis is the data of Keenan
and Kintsch (Kintsch, 1974) and Reder (1976; 1979) who have shown that
subjects are able to verify inferred statements as quickly as explicit
ones, given a sufficient delay interval between reading and test.
This result implies that the inferences have been included in the text
representation. If inferences are not part of the text
representation, verifying inferred statements should take longer than
verifying explicit ones because they have to be regenerated at the
time of test. However, subjects may be performing plausibility checks
for both types of sentences to perform the verification (Reder, 1976;
1979). Thus, regeneration may not be needed to perform the task on
inferred statements, and the Kintsch and Reder experiments are biased
against the hypothesis.
Summary of Alternative Conceptualizations
. Two hypotheses have been
suggested to account for the pattern of results presented here. They
both incorporate the McKoon and Ratcliff (1980b; 1981) distinction
between activating inferred information and integrating it with the
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text. For both hypotheses, it is ass»ed that inferences are
generated on-Une; what differs is the disposition of the inference
following its generation.
The integration lag hypothesis offers the suggestion that
integration of inferred material will occur if given enough time
and/or resources. It is easily tested with the same basic materials
and procedures employed in these experiments. We should observe
priming due to inference integration by introducing some neutral
sentences in the stories, perhaps at the endings, to allow integration
to occur. On the other hand, introducing a larger processing load
just after having generated an inference should decrease the
probability of integration.
The regeneration hypothesis suggests that inferences are never
stored. Instead, they can be regenerated when needed from the
explicitly-asserted information that is stored in memory. Such a
position may be difficult to test, however. If no evidence can be
found to support the integration lag hypothesis, then inference
regeneration is supported by default.
One last position worth considering is that both of the
hypotheses presented here are correct for different situations. This
will be discussed next.
A Reconsideration of Inference Necessity . The work that went into this
dissertation was shaped by the conventional wisdom that when coherence
is broken, an inference must be generated. My results upheld this
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position in that they provided evidence for the existence of inference
activation. But what of forward, or non-necessary xnferencesT The
data are inconclusive. McKoon and Ratcliffs (1981) posxtion is that
forward inferences are not only generated, but also integrated wxth
the text. Dosher and Corbett (1982) failed to find evxdence even for
activation when subjects were under normal reading instructions. It
is important to note, however, that when they instructed their
subjects to generate inferences while they were reading, Dosher and
Corbett obtained the inference activation that they were not able to
find otherwise. This suggests that, like elaboration in general, the
reader's motivation and intention are important factors in the
inference process. For example, readers of detective stories may
purposely slow their reading rate in order to generate and integrate
all manner of inferences that would help them to guess the identity of
a murderer. 3 The opposite situation occurs when the reader is bored
and is moving mechanically through a text. In this case the person
may not notice a break in coherence, or may simply not be motivated
enough to generate and store the necessary inferential bridge.
Needless to say, forward inferencing would not occur at all in this
reading situation. The noteworthy point here is that if we base
theories of text processing on the importance of maintaining text
coherence, as do Kintsch and van Dijk (1978), we must realize that we
are assuming the ideal situation—a motivated and interested reader.
These arguments suggest another reason for why longer passages
may be needed in order to show the effects of inferential processing
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-these may be inherently more interesting for the subjects to read.
People who read longer stories may be more motivated to generate
inferences and elaborations and integrate them with the text. A
reasonable suggestion at this point is that cognitive researchers
should not attempt to decide between models of inference that are
either all-or-none. Instead, it would be useful to specify the text
and situational variables that are important determinants of
inferential processing.
Concluding Comments
These investigations of backward inference have provided evidence
that backward inferences are activated during the reading of text.
The data do not support the position that activated inferences are
then integrated with explicitly-asserted text propositions in memory.
I have considered several different ways in which the methodology may
have interfered with the tests being conducted, and have offered
suggestions for modifications. I have also proposed two different
models of inference that are consistent with my pattern of results,
and indicated that a reader's intention and motivation may play
important roles in the process.
This dissertation makes two important contributions. First, the
results force acknowledgment of the distinction between comprehension
and integration, and furthermore they suggest that integration is not
a necessary consequence of comprehension. Future models of text
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processing will have to take the distinction into account.
Second, the results cast doubt on the commonly accepted notion
that backward inferences are integrated during text comprehension. In
most cases the literature on inference is methodologically weak and
can not dispel the doubt. This situation is problematic because my
results are inconsistent with the on-line elaborate processing
position. Recall that this position provides the theoretical
underpinning of explanations of several memory phenomena. What is
needed i-g a more complete understanding of the effects of variables
like motivation, intention, and type of inference to be generated on
inferential processing. By placing constraints on inference, we will
gain information about elaborative processing in general, and also we
will have a better understanding of the conditions under which we
should expect to observe the memory phenomena in question.
FOOTNOTES
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It is possible that inferences could be stored in memory but notintegrated „lth the text representation. They could simply bestored in a separate structure, an "inference list." which
. may beattached via a single link to the text. This is what h^ L
andTmlth'a^r^TH
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^ aCUO"S * Kowal ?nd Smith (1980). There are two reasons why this possibility
"ill not be considered further. First, data from most of hestudies reviewed earlier argue against an independent storage
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Second, the important question for
r»th. I It ?u
13 ^ "hether inferen«= «e in memory, buta er whether they are integrated with the explicitly assertedinformation as is claimed by the elaborate processinghypothesis under consideration.
I would like to thank Jerry Myers for suggesting this example.
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APPENDIX A
CRITICAL MATERIALS FOR EXPERIMENTS 1 AND 2
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1. The group of friends left for vacation
The trip was smooth until the unfortunate incident.
Version X ; Jerry got the jack from the trunk.
YersiorL2: Jerry filled the two-gallon can at the station.
Version 1 Version 2
Inferred Prime: FLAT GAS
Target: XRIp
*********************^^
2. Jim was not used to having such a difficult time.
The pair was disappointing.
Version 1
: Jim had hoped his feet wouldn't hurt that much.
Version 2
: Jim has hoped for three of a kind from the dealer.
Version 1 Version 2
Inferred Prime: SHOES CARDS
Target: PAIR
Question : Why was Jim disappointed?
3. Jane was not enjoying the afternoon at the ballpark.
The situation was uncomfortable at the baseball game.
Version 1 : Jane was sorry she had forgotten her umbrella.
Version 2 : Jane was sorry she had forgotten her cushion.
Version 1 Version 2
Inferred Prime: RAIN SEAT
Target: GAME
Question : Why was Jane uncomfortable?
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Along with other people, Mark stood and clappedEveryone at the stadxum was excited by the Incredible event.
Version^ Mark had never seen a better marchmg band performance.
Yersion_2: Mark had never seen a 106-yard kickoff return before.
Version 1 Version 2
Inferred Prime: HALFTIME FOOTBALL
Target: EVENT
(This story was replaced by Story #25 for Experiment 2.)
***********^
A janitor had been called by the office worker.
The office door annoyed the secretary because of the problem.
Version 1 : The janitor used oil to stop the squeaking.
Version 2
: The janitor took apart the mechanism to get the key out.
Version 1 Version 2
Inferred Prime: HINGE LOCK
Target: DOOR
Athletic competition can cause injuries.
Mike broke his leg while playing the sport.
Version 1: He tripped over his own feet while sliding into home.
Version 2: He tripped over his own skates while chasing the puck.
Version 1 Version 2
Inferred Prime: BASEBALL HOCKEY
Target: SPORT
Question : How did Mike get hurt?
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7. Frank is usually prepared when things go wrong.The storm caused a problem at home that night!
Version 1 : F^nk placed a bucket in one corner.
Version^: Frank lit candles in several rooms.
Version 1 Version 2
Inferred Prime: LEAK POWER
Tar9et: STORM
****************^
8. After the check-up Pete got a lecture from the family physician.The doctor warned Pete about his bad habit.
Version^: He didn't want his patient to get liver disease.
Version 2: He didn't want his patient to get lung cancer.
Version 1 Version 2
Inferred Prime: DRINKING SMOKING
Target
: HABIT
***********************************^
9. The senior prom was just two hours away.
One part of the rented tuxedo didn't fit properly.
Version 1 : Dave had to use a tight belt to avoid a possible
embarrassment
.
Version 2 : Dave left his top button undone so his neck wouldn't
hurt
.
Version 1 Version 2
Inferred Prime: PANTS COLLAR
Target: TUXEDO
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10. Jeff was in his dorm room preparing for a finalStudying for the exam became harder as the pain'got worse.
Versionr: Jeff washed down the antacid with some water.
Version^: jeff washed down the aspirins with some water.
Version 1 Version 2
Inferred Prime: STOMACH HEADACHE
Target: PAIN
*****************************^
11. It was going to be a long evening.
unco^rtabl^
111^^ ^ ™ h™^> ^ temperature was
Version!: The family huddled by the fireplace to keep warm.
Version^: The family opened the windows in hope of a cool breeze.
Version 1 Version 2
Inferred Prime: FURNACE AIR CONDITIONER
Target
: HOUSE
Question: What was the problem with the house?
12. Randy groaned at his bad luck.
It was a calamity when the glass broke.
Version 1: Randy couldn't afford the expensive car repairs.
Version 2 : Randy couldn't save the fish from dying.
Version 1 Version 2
Inferred Prime: WINDSHIELD AQUARIUM
Target: GLASS
102
13
'
?he
r
usu;iTT? WatChing the ce^bration.i sual tradition was observed.
V-ion^: Ellen tossed her bouquet to the group of women
,
Vi£sion_2: Ellen made a »ish a took a deep breath.
Version 1 Version 2
Inferred Prime: WEDDING CANDLES
Tar9et: PARTY
14. On Saturday morninq Steve had t-n r«=.+-^v,
He knew it had to I done,^^-^^^
Version^: Steve started with a load of dark things first.
Yersipn_2: Steve started with the pots and pans first.
Version 1 Version 2
Inferred Prime: LAUNDRY DISHES
Target
: CHORE
****************^
15. A large crowd gathered around and stared.
The incredible gem in the display astonished the visitors to the
museum.
Version 1: It had been produced by a huge oyster.
Version 2
: The clear sparkling stone had been cut by an expert.
Version 1 Version 2
Inferred Prime: PEARL DIAMOND
Target: GEM
********************************^^
16. It was a hot summer day.
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A back yard hedge was in severe need of attention.
Version^: Cindy unraveled the garden hose.
Yersipn_2: Cindy sharpened her garden shears.
Vers ion 1 Version 2
Inferred Prime: WATER TRIM
Target: HEDGE
Question: What was Cindy going to do to the hedge?
17. The night was dark.
Ed had driven past the s.gn at the intersection without seeing it.
Version^: He had to stop at a gas station for directions.
Version^: He had to pay a 25-dollar fine to the judge.
Version 1 Version 2
Inferred Prime: LOST TICKET
Target: SIGN
18. The employee training paid off.
The young woman was not unnerved by the incident at the bank.
Version 1 : She calmly handed over the money.
Version 2: She quickly ran to get an extinguisher.
Version 1 Version 2
Inferred Prime: ROBBERY FIRE
Target: BANK
Question : What happened at the bank?
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19. The state governor was upset at what had happened
^occurrence at the prison had received^ attention in the
Version^ The army was ceiled out to help put down thedisturbance.
Version^: Five crafty convicts had made it over the wall.
Version 1 Version 2
Inferred Prime: riot ESCAPE
Target: PRISON
20. Joe looked outside his front door.
The footing on the steps was bad because or their condition.
Version_l: Joe used rock salt to take care of the problem.
Version 2
: Joe shoveled off the latest storm's accumulation.
Version 1 Version 2
Inferred Prime: ICE SNOW
Target: STEPS
Question : What was wrong with the steps?
**********************************^
21. Travelers were confused and angry.
Severe weather closed the airport.
Version 1 : The runway flooded when a nearby river overflowed.
Version 2 : The dense grey mist made flying dangerous.
Version 1 Version 2
Inferred Prime: RAIN FOG
Target: AIRPORT
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22. A beagle broke away from his master during a walkThe curious dog chased a wild animal in the woods!
Y§£^ :
Its' ^se
S OVmer rem°V6d qUiUs that
—
^ck
-
Version 1 Version 2
Inferred Prime: SKUNK PORCUPINE
Target: DOG
*****************^
23. Betty was trying to finish the job in a hurry
Unfortunately, the machine was broken.
Version^: Betty had to hang the wet clothes out on a line.
Version_2: Betty had to write out the memo by hand.
Version 1 Version 2
Inferred Prime: DRYER TYPEWRITER
Target: MACHINE
Question : What gave Betty a problem?
24. The news shocked the scientific world.
The scientists were surprised by the occurrence in the mountains.
Version 1: Townspeople felt strong tremors for several days.
Version 2 : Townspeople were evacuated because of the lava.
Version 1 Version 2
Inferred Prime: EARTHQUAKE VOLCANO
Target: MOUNTAINS
(Neutral first sentence omitted.)
Earl was having a problem using the tool properly.
Version^
„
e was bending the nails he was trying to pound.
Version^: He was splintering the wood he was trying to out
Version 1 Version 2
Inferred Prime: HAMMER SAW
Target: T00L
(This story replaced Story #4 in Experiment 2.)
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CRITICAL MATERIALS FOR EXPERIMENTS 3 AND 4
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l
' ™/ fit/fura9e ' the angry animal turned ™* chargedThe crowd cheered as the matador deftly avowed the rush.
Prime: ANIMAL Target: BULL
Question : What Rushed?
2
* fppUance" ^ ^ Cheered When Ed bro^ht ™ the
Sonn the spinning blades were blowing fresh air to all the people.
Prime: APPLIANCE Target : FAN
Question : Why did everyone cheer?
*****************^
3. Jerry wasn't aware of the bird in the tree outside of his window.When it hooted loudly, he was startled.
Prime
: BIRD Target : OWL
Question : What was in the tree?
**********************************************
4. Randy couldn't believe how beautiful the city was.
The view from the Eiffel tower left a big impression on him.
Prime : CITY Target : PARIS
Question : Where was Randy?
***********************************************************************
5. Pam went to the store to buy the type of cloth she needed.
She wanted to make a pair of blue jeans for her husband.
Prime : CLOTH Target : DENIM
Question : What did Pam buy?
***********************************************************************
6. Although it was expensive, Paul decided to buy the article of
clothing.
Its pinstriped material and vest would make him look classy.
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Prime: CLOTHING Target: SUIT
Question: What did Paul buy?
7. Political unrest threatened the stabilitv of n,a
Many protestors had been arrested S^ a^ COUlltry '
Priine: COUNTRY Target : GREECE
Question
: Where was political unrest occurring?
8
'
^hPrI
iOUS Crim6
^ b6en COI™itted in the quiet little town.
purpose^" °
VerWhelming 6vidence that the fire had been set on
Prime: CRIME Target : ARSON
Question
: What crime had been committed in the town?
***^***********************^
9. Ron was quite an expert at the traditional type of dance
All of the women at the Polish festival hoped to be his partner.
Prime: DANCE Target : POLKA
Question : What was Ron an expert at?
*************************************^^
10. Ted's disease prevented him from having alcoholic drinks.
He also hated giving himself insulin injections.
Prime: DISEASE Target : DIABETES
Question : What was Ted's medical problem?
*****************************^^
11. The ache was making studying difficult, so Wendy took some of the
drug.
Her headache soon disappeared.
Prime : DRUG Target : ASPIRIN
Question : What did Wendy do?
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12
•
°Ut
°
£ Shape
'
S
°
he^ « »ith which to tri„
He spends an hour in the pool each day.
Prime: EXERCISE Target : SWIMMING
Question
: What does Andy do to keep in shape
•"•••"••••**^^
13. At the aquarium Tom saw a fish he had never seen close up beforeIt was a great white, a deadly species with huge jaws.
Prime: FISH Target : SHARK
Question : What did Tom see?
******^*************^
14. Harry was annoyed when he saw the little yellow flowers
He hated to see all those weeds in his lawn.
Prime: FLOWER Target : DANDELION
Question: What was the problem with Harry's lawn?
******************************^
15. All of the children at the picnic took large slices of the fruit
While enjoying the red juicy treat, they had a seed spitting
contest.
Prime : FRUIT Target : WATERMELON
Question : What were the children eating?
*****************************************************^
16. The power company could not produce electricity because the fuel
needed had not been delivered.
The nuclear reactors sat idle until the situation was corrected.
Prime : FUEL Target : URANIUM
Question : Why were the reactors idle?
*********************************************************
17. Although it was a bit worn, the second-hand article of furniture
that Barb bought would be sufficient.
Ill
All it needed was a new shade and bulb.
Prime: FURNITURE Target: LAMP
Question
: What did Barb buy?
***********«***««***..*...*.«.^
18
' d^pUy
9
" ViSit°rS "erS aSt°nished *>y th* «i" of the 9em i„ the
It had been produced by a huge oyster.
Prirne: GEM Target : PEARL
Question
: What astonished the visitors?
***********************^
19. Bob was dismayed to discover an infestation of the insects in hishouse
.
The exterminator reported that they had eaten much of his wooden
staircase
.
Prime : INSECT Target : TERMITE
Question : What had infested Bob's house?
20. Kathy sat in the orchestra pit during the song and got ready to
play the instrument.
At just the right moment, she crashed the two brass discs together.
Prime: INSTRUMENT Target : CYMBALS
Question : What was Kathy playing?
**********************************************************************
1. Rick asked for a piece of jewelry for his birthday.
He needed to keep better track of the time since he was always
late.
Prime : JEWELRY Target : WATCH
Question : What did Rick want for his birthday?
**********************************************************************
2. Ann worked hard to study the language.
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£^ii^m^.5ssr' she en3oyed transiati^
Prime: LANGUAGE Target: LATIN
Question: What was Ann studying?
23. Many bottles of the liquor were behind the bar, wait™ for theguests' arrival. « icing r
When the wedding reception started, the corks werP popped andeveryone enjoyed the bubbily drink. P
Prime: LIQUOR Target: CHAMPAGNE
Question: What were the guests drinking?
***************************^
24. During the traditional holiday dinner, father was in charge ofcarving the meat. n t
He also took responsibility every Thanksgiving for dishing out thestuffing. y
Prime: MEAT Target : TURKEY
Question : What was father carving?
*************************************
25. After the mishap in the lab, the science teacher warned Shelly not
to touch the metal with her bare hands.
She carefully cleaned up the silvery liguid that had escaped from
the broken thermometer.
Prime: METAL Target : MERCURY
Question : What wasn't Shelly supposed to touch?
**********************************************************************
6. Although many people thought it was dreary, Jane liked this month.
She looked forward to the Thanksgiving holiday at its end.
Prime : MONTH Target : NOVEMBER
Question : What month was it?
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27. Dave couldn't understand the music his dad listPned toHe disliked the fact that the stories „ie 1lyrics were written in Italian. in SOngs whose
mS1C Target: OPERA
Question
: What music did Dave's dad listen to?
28. Little Joan loved the pet she received as a gift for Easter
31 * U£dte bundle of fur had — ^
PET Target : RABBIT
Question: What type of pet did Joan receive?
******************************^
29. Lou was excited when he focused in on the planet with histelescope.
The rings were clearly visible.
Prime: PLANET Target : SATURN
Question : What did Lou see?
**************************************************^^
30. James thought that he would enjoy the profession he wanted.
He loved riding tractors and plows through the fields.
Prime: PROFESSION Target : FARMER
Question : What did James want to be?
31. Mary called the relative that lived nearest to her.
Her sister's daughter was in the next town.
Prime : RELATIVE Target : NIECE
Question : Whom did Mary call?
***********************************************************************
32. The kids learned all about the reptile at the natural history
museum.
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They were amazed at the huge skeleton of the prehistoric creature.
Prime: REPTILE Target: DINOSAUR
Question
: What did the kids learn about?
***™*^
33. Maria hated having to take the science course.She thought learning about rocks was terribly boring.
Prime: SCIENCE Target: GEOLOGY
Question: What class did Maria dislike?
*************************^
The tentacles of the creature were visible on his plate.
Prime: SEAFOOD Target : SQUID
Question : What did Jack order?
************************^^
35. The ship was cruising along on the calm sea.
Suddenly it dived under water until only its periscope was visible.
Prime: SHIP Target : SUBMARINE
Question : Where did the ship go?
36. Mike broke his leg while playing the sport.
He tripped over his own skates while chasing the puck.
Prime : SPORT Target : HOCKEY
Question : What was Mike doing when he broke his leg?
**********************************************************************
7. Henry was well-traveled, but he had never been to this state
before
.
While he was there he learned how to dance the hula.
Prime : STATE Target : HAWAII
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Question
: Where was Henry?
****************************^^
38
' S^Sd^ d° j °b ' ^ nSeded t0 get theW tool
It took many powerful swings before the big tree was chopped down.
Prime: TOOL Target : AXE
Question: What did Doug take out of the shed?
**************************************************
39. Denise's children were fascinated by the new toy.
They liked looking at the pictures of the kings, gueens, and jacks.
Prime: TOY Target : CARDS
Question : What were the kids playing with?
************************************************
40. Luke gazed at the tree that was blooming beautifully in the back
yard.
He wondered how George Washington could have chopped down one of
those.
Prime: TREE Target : CHERRY
Question : What was blooming in the yard?
********************************************************** il1tit * 1tftit t i(ic1lit1l
41. Nancy did everything she could think of to get little Johnny to
eat the vegetable.
Johnny finally gave in when she reminded him that Popeye eats it.
Prime : VEGETABLE Target : SPINACH
Question : What wouldn't little Johnny eat?
****************************************************
42. Chuck's wife didn't like him to take the vehicle to work.
She made sure that he always wore his helmet when he rode on it.
Prime : VEHICLE Target : MOTORCYCLE
Question : What did Chuck ride to work?
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Prime: WEAPON Target: ARROW
Question: What did the Indian reach for?
**************^*^
44. The bad weather closed the airport.
The dense grey mist made flying dangerous.
Prime: WEATHER Target : FOG
Question
: What closed the airport?
************^
45. The rickety old building collapsed last week.
It did serious damage to the two cars it housed.
Prime: BUILDING Target : GARAGE
Question : What collapsed?
^************************^
Stories Added for Experiment 4
46. The visiting scientists were surprised by how warm the type of
dwelling was
.
They were grateful to the Eskimo tribe for carving the ice and
helping to construct it.
Prime : DWELLING Target : IGLOO
Question : What did the Eskimo tribe help the scientists construct?
************************************^^
47. While at the restaurant, Robin and Greg asked for the customary
eating utensils.
They never used forks when eating at a Chinese place.
Prime : UTENSILS Target : CHOPSTICKS
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Question: What did Robin and Greg ask for?
48. The little girl ate all of her vegetables so that she could havesome of her favorite dessert. 6
Thrones with the chocolate chips and walnuts were the ones she
Prime: DESSERT Target : COOKIES
Question: What did the little girl love for dessert?
APPENDIX C
INSTRUCTIONS TO SUBJECTS
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you
Instructions for Experimgnfj^
In this experiment you will read simple stories presented to
on the TV screen. After you've read a story, you will be shown a
number of words one after the other. Your task iS to decide whether
or not the words appeared somewhere in the story. Here are the
details of how this experiment works.
Each story you will read consists of three sentences. They will
be shown to you one at a time. Specifically, each story starts with
the word "READY?" on the screen. When you are ready, simply press the
thumb switch on the inside right of the console in front of you and
the first story sentence will appear. It will stay on as long as you
need it to. When you have read and understood this sentence, press
the thumb switch again, and then the next sentence will be shown. You
simply go through the stories like this, pressing the switch when you
have finished with a sentence.
When you press the switch after the third (and last) sentence of
a story, the word recognition task begins. A word will be presented
on the screen; you should decide as guickly as possible whether that
word appeared somewhere in the story just read. You indicate your
response by using the Yes-No levers on the response console. If you
don't respond within five seconds, you'll hear a short beep to tell
you that a new word is coming on, and then the new word will appear.
In all, there are six words to respond to; they are presented
automatically one after the other, so all you have to do is use the
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yes-no levers for this task.
Occasionally you win be given a question to answer about the
story after you have done the word recognition task. Being able to
answer the question depends on your having understood the story.
There is an intercom in the lab that picks up your voice, so when you
see a question, you can just answer aloud and I'll hear you in my room
next door. Finally, to give you some indication of how well you're
doing, your average time to respond (in thousandths of a second) and
the number of errors made for each set of six words will appear on the
screen,
In all, there are 30 stories and word lists to do, with short
breaks after every six. The first six stories are for practice and
with these you will be asked a question after each.
These are a lot of instructions, but before we begin I'll review
them with you. Let me emphasize one more thing, though. It is
extremely important that you understand the sets of three sentences as
a story. The sentences are sometimes a bit vague or disconnected, but
they do form a comprehensible story if you think about what you are
reading. You may need to fill in information so that the sentences
make sense as a story; the important point is that you shouldn't push
the thumb switch to bring on the words until you are sure that you
understand the third sentence and the story as a whole.
121
Instructions for Experiment 2
in this experiment you will read simple stories presented to you
on the TV screen. After you've read a story, you will be shown a
single word. Your task is to decide whether or not the word shown
after the story appeared somewhere in it. Here are the details of how
this experiment works.
Each "story" you will read consists of two sentences. They will
be shown to you one at a time. Specifically, each story starts with
the word "READY?" on the screen. When you are ready, simply press the
thumb switch (it's on the inside right of the console in front of you)
and the first sentence of the first story will appear. It will stay
on as long as you need it to. When you have read and understood this
sentence, press the thumb switch again, and then the next sentence
will be shown. You simply go through the stories like this, pressing
the switch when you have finished with a sentence.
When you press the switch after the second (and last) sentence of
a story, the word recognition task is given. You will see three X's
on the screen; these serve as a fixation point, so you should look at
them. Half of a second after the X's appear they are replaced for a
short time (1/4 or 3/4ths of a second) by a word. This word serves as
a cue for the next word which appears on the screen, the target word.
It is the target word which you must decide about. If it appeared
somewhere in the two sentences you just read, pull up the lever marked
"yes;" if it did not appear in the sentences, pull up the lever marked
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"no." To the stilus sequence is! Fixatlon point ^
at the point,, cue word presentation (read the cue-no other response
is reauired,, and target word decision (decrde if the word was in the
sentences,. The target word stays on the screen untrl you „a,e a
response to It or until five seconds are up. whichever is sooner, if
you don't make a response within the five seconds allowed, the target
word will disappear, and the word "ERROR" will appear on the screen.
"ERROR" will also show up if you've made an incorrect response to a
target word.
Occasionally you will be given a question to answer about the
story after you have done the word recognition task. Being able to
answer the question depends on your having understood the story.
There is an intercom in the lab that picks up your voice, so when you
see a question, you can just answer aloud and I'll hear you in my room
next door.
In all, there are 72 stories to do, with short breaks after every
12. The first six stories are for practice and with these you will be
asked a question after each; afterwards questions occur randomly.
These are a lot of instructions, but before we begin I'll review
them with you. Let me emphasize one more thing, though. It is
extremely important that you understand the pairs sentences as a
story. The sentences are sometimes a bit vague or disconnected, but
they do form a comprehensible story if you think about what you are
reading. You may need to fill in information so that the sentences
make sense as a story; the important point is that you shouldn't push
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the ttanb switch to bring on the word until you ere sure thet you
understand the sentence pair as a story.
Instructions for Experimpnfg 3 and 4
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In this experiment you will read sxmple stones presented to you
on the TV screen. After you've read a story, you will be shown a
single word. Your task is to read the word aloud as fast as you can.
Here are the details of how this experiment works.
Each story you will read consists of two sentences. They will be
shown to you one at a time. Specifically, each story starts with the
word "READY?" on the screen. When you are ready, sxmply press one of
the two triggers on the sides of the console in front of you (use the
right-hand trigger if right-handed, the left trigger if left-handed)
and the first sentence of the first story will appear. It will stay
on as long as you need it to. When you have read and understood this
sentence, pull the trigger again, and then the next sentence will be
shown. You simply go through the stories like this, pressing the
switch when you have finished with a sentence.
When you press the switch after the second (and last) sentence of
a story, the word pronunciation phase starts. You will see three X's
on the screen; these serve as a fixation point, so you should look at
them. Half of a second after the X's appear they are replaced for a
short time (1/4 of a second) by a cue word. You should read the cue
word to yourself, but no response to it is reguired. The cue word
will guickly disappear and be replaced by a target word. You should
read this word out loud as guickly as you can. A special microphone
connected to the computer will detect the sound of your voice and
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erase the TV screen. Following this. you win see . question about
the story you just read. Being able to answer the question „U1
usually depend on your having understood the story. you should just
answer the question out loud; I'll hear your answers in my room next
door through the lab intercom.
To summarize, the stimulus sequence after reading a pair of
sentences is: 1-Fixation point (look at the X's); 2--Cue word (just
read the cue silently; no other response is required); and 3-Target
word presentation and target pronunciation (read the target aloud).
If you haven't pronounced the word before 2 1/2 seconds, it disappears
from the screen and the words "TRIAL OVER" will be shown briefly.
Also if you misread the word, or if the microphone fails to pick up
your voice properly, the word "ERROR" will appear. Finally, 4—
A
question will be shown after each story (answer out loud).
In all, there are 120* stories to do, with short breaks after
every 24**. There are also six stories for practice at the
experiment's beginning.
These are a lot of instructions, but before we begin I'll review
them with you. Let me emphasize one more thing, though. It is
extremely important that you understand the pairs sentences as a
story. The sentences are sometimes a bit vague or disconnected, but
they do form a comprehensible story if you think about what you are
reading. You may need to fill in information so that the sentences
make sense as a story; the important point is that you shouldn't pull
the trigger to bring on the word for pronunciation until you are sure
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that you understand the sentence pair as a story.
"There were 128 stories for Experiment 4.
*
"Block size for Experiment 4 was 32.
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APPENDIX D
RESULTS OF STATISTICAL ANALYSES FOR EXPERIMENTS 1, 2, 3, AND 4
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TABLE 8
RESULTS OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON PRIME TRIAL RT FOR EXPERIMENT 1
ANALYSIS OVER SUBJECTS
Source df
Between Subiects 23
Version (V) 1
Form (F) 1
VF 1
Subjects (S) /VF 20
Within Subjects 120
MS
44263.60
123766.17
105913.91
287612.67
Contributions to EMS
S/VF + V
.15
S/VF + F
.43
S/VF + VF
.37
S/VF
Position (P) 2 120849.80 SP/VF + P 2.77
PV 2 62075.26 SP/VF + PV 1.42
PF 2 59633.59 SP/VF + PF 1.36
PVF 2 37455.68 SP/VF + PVF
.86
SP/VF 40 43700.56 SP/VF
Condition (C) 1 447559.89 SC/VF + C 8.56
CV 1 9696.83 SC/VF + CV .19
CF 1 92348.63 SC/VF + CF 1.77
CVF 1 732.02 SC/VF + CVF .01
SC/VF 20 52303.98 SC/VF
0705
0084
PC
PCV
PCF
PCVF
SPC/VF
2
2
2
2
40
106635.08
13205.38
201500.78
34330.81
27672.74
SPC/VF + PC 3.85 .0295
SPC/VF + PCV .48
SPC/VF + PCF 7.28 .0020
SPC/VF + PCVF 1.24
SPC/VF
Random Effects Variable: Subjects
For this and all ANOVA tables to follow, only those probability values
less than .10 are shown. An exception occurs in item analyses where
certain p-values are shown to exceed .25. The corresponding tests were
carried out as preliminaries to the pooling of mean sguares. Pooling
occurred whenever possible for the purpose of increasing error degrees
of freedom.
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TABLE 9
RESULTS OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON PRIME TRIAL RT FOR EXPERIMENT 1-
ANALYSIS OVER ITEMS
Source df MS Contributions to EMS F
Between Items 47
Set (S)
Form (F) /S
Position (P)
SP
FP/S
Items (I) /SFP
1 71. 31 I/SFP + F/S + S .00
2 78736. 00 I/SFP + F/S 2.79
2 74231. 00 I/SFP + FP/S + P .91
2 17547. 00 I/SFP + FP/S + SP .22
4 81216. 00 I/SFP + FP/S 2.88
36 28234. 00 I/SFP
0748
.0364
Within Items 48
Version (V) 1 25174. 00 IV/SFP + FV/S + V .89*
VS (Condition) 1 335520. 00 IV/SFP + FV/S + VS 11.87*
FV/S 2 24269. 00 IV/SFP + FV/S .85*
VP 2 18365. 00 IV/SFP + FPV/S + VP .65*
VPS (Cond. x P) 2 52685. 00 IV/SFP + FPV/S + VPS 1.85*
FPV/S 4 27119. 00 IV/SFP + FPV/S .95
IV/SFP 36 28608. 00 IV/SFP
.0013
>.2500
>.2500
Random Effects Variables: Set, Form, Items
*Tested against an error term consisting of a pool of MSiv/sfp and
MSfpv/s to yield MS* = 28459.3 on 40 df (preliminary test of FPV/S
against IV/SFP resulted in non-significant alpha level > .25).
**Tested against an error term consisting of a pool of MS* and MSfv/s
to yield MS** = 28259.7 on 42 df (preliminary test of FV/S against MS*
resulted in non-significant alpha level > .25).
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TABLE 10
BONFERRONI T-TESTS ON PRIME TRIAL RT FOR EXPERIMENT 1
Test Mean Diff SDDiff df
Inferred Primes
Position 1 vs. Position 2 69.63 200.41 1 70 23Position 2 vs. Position 3 108.32 324.67 1*64 23Position 1 vs. Position 3 177.90 398.68 2. 19 23 <.0333
Neutral Primes
Position 1 vs. Position 2 72.18 309.15 1.14 23
Position 2 vs. Position 3 56.22 197.20 1^40 23
Position 1 vs. Position 3 15.96 199.72 ^39 23
Needed for significance: p < .0333 (family-wise error rate = .05, one-
tailed)
.
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TABLE 11
RESULTS OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON PRIME TRIAL ERROR RATES
FOR EXPERIMENT 1
Source df MS Contributions to EMS
Between Subjects 23
Version (V) 1
• \J £t *J & o/ Vr + V
.60
Form (F) 1 .13165 S/VF + F 3.11
VF 1 .03841 S/VF + VF
.91
Subjects (S) /VF 20 .04239 S/VF
Within Subjects 120
Position (P) 2 .01153 SP/VF + P .67
PV 2 .01922 SP/VF + PV 1.11
PF 2 .04241 SP/VF + PF 2.46
PVF 2 .00448 SP/VF + PVF
.26
SP/VF 40 .01726 SP/VF
Condition (C) 1 .33284 SC/VF + C 20.24
CV 1 .00583 SC/VF + CV .35
CF 1 .09962 SC/VF + CF 6.06
CVF 1 .02213 SC/VF + CVF 1.35
SC/VF 20 .01645 SC/VF
PC 2 .00131 SPC/VF f PC .08
PCV 2 .01212 SPC/VF f PCV .74
PCF 2 .09031 SPC/VF f PCF 5.49
PCVF 2 .00438 SPC/VF f PCVF .27
SPC/VF 40 .01645 SPC/VF
0933
0985
0002
0231
0295
,0078
Random Effects Variable: Subjects
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TABLE 12
RESULTS OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON TARGET TRIAL RT FOR EXPERIMENT 3 •ANALYSIS OVER SUBJECTS
l '
Contributions to EMS
Source df MS
Between Subjects 23
Version (V) i 3431.13
Form (F) i 377123.93
Sublets (S) /VP 20 258383:74
S/VF + V
.01
S/VF + F 1.46
S/VF + VF 3.09
S/VF
Within Subjects 120
Position (P) 2 266300. 25
PV 2 72994. 94
PF 2 28800. 79
PVF 2 21543. 06
SP/VF 40 68221. 10
Condition (C) 1 3161. 72
CV 1 8101. 35
CF 1 38
CVF 1 224. 78
SC/VF 20 54183. 34
PC 2 36508. 10
PCV 2 50289. 96
PCF 2 95174. 55
PCVF 2 10412. 90
SPC/VF 40 45971. 32
SP/VF + P 3.90
SP/VF + PV 1.07
SP/VF + PF
.42
SP/VF + PVF
.32
SP/VF
SC/VF + C
.06
SC/VF + CV
.15
SC/VF + CF
.00
SC/VF + CVF
.00
SC/VF
SPC/VF + PC .79
SPC/VF + PCV 1.09
SPC/VF + PCF 2.07
SPC/VF + PCVF .23
SPC/VF
0283
Random Effects Variable: Subjects
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TABLE 13
RESULTS OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON TARGET TRIAL RT FOR EXPERIMENT 1ANALYSIS OVER ITEMS
Source df MS Contributions to EMS
Between Items 23
Set (S) 1 J 0 . x /OnI/SP + s .00*
Position (P) 2 163010. 00 I/SP + SP + P 1 .68*SP 2 60332. 00 I/SP + SP
.60Items (I) /SP 18 101050. 00 I/SP
Within Items 72
Version (V) 1 11824. 00 IV/SP + VS + V .30**
VS 1 5900. 70 IV/SP + VS
.13
VP 2 48059. 00 IV/SP + VPS + VP 10 .15
VPS 2 4733. 70 IV/SP + VPS
.10
IV/SP 18 28608. 00 IV/SP
Condition (C) 1 5588. 50 CI/SP + CS + c .02
CS 1 285750. 00 CI/SP + CS 12 .78***
CP 2 26202. 00 CI/SP + CSP + CP 1 .37
CSP 2 19146. 00 CI/SP + CSP .86
CI/SP 18 22281. 00 CI/SP
VC 1 3648. 70 VCI/SP + VCS + VC .05***
VCS 1 613110. 00 VCI/SP + VCS 8
VCP 2 37629. 00 VCI/SP + VCSP + VCP 2 .72
VCSP 2 13825. 00 VCI/SP + VCSP .18
VCI/SP 18 77781. 00 VCI/SP
Random Effects Variables Set, Items
>.2500
>.2500
.0897
>.2500
.0021
>.2500
0067
>.2500
Tested against an error term consisting of a pool of MSi/ S p and MS S p
to yield MS* = 96978 on 20 df (preliminary test of SP against S/SP
resulted in non-significant alpha level > .25).
*Tested against an error term consisting of a pool of MSvi/sp, MSvsp,
and MSvs to yield MS** = 39484.7 on 21 df (preliminary tests of VSP
and VS against IV/SP resulted in non-significant alpha levels > .25).
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T6f 6LagainSt - an err°r t6rm consisting of a pool of MS ci/S p, MS CSP
against CI/SP, and their pool against CP resulted in non-significant
alpha levels > .25).
"Tested against an error term consisting of a pool of MS V ci/ SPMSspvc, and MSpvc to yield MS**** = 68318.55 on 22 df (preliminary
tests of SPVC against VCI/SP, and their pool against PVC resultedin non-significant alpha levels > .25).
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TABLE 14
BONFERRONI T-TESTS ON TARGET TRIAL RT FOR EXPERIMENT I
Tes t Mean Diff SD Di
Marginal Means
df
Position 1 vs. Position 2 136.77 259.92 2.58 23 < 0333Position 1 vs. Position 3 119.53 230.15 2 54 23 <'o333Position 2 vs. Position 3 17.26 271.17 31 2 3
'Needed for significance: p < .0333 (family-wise error rate = .05 one-
tailed)
.
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TABLE 15
RESULTS OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON TARGET TRIAL ERROR RATES
FOR EXPERIMENT 1
Source df
Between Subjects 23
MS Contributions to EMS
Version (V)
Form (F)
VF
Subjects (S) /VF
1 .01146 S/VF + V
1 .00502 S/VF + F
1 .00358 S/VF + VF
20 .02464 S/VF
,47
.20
.15
Within Subjects 120
Position (P) 2 .01679 SP/VF + P 1.66
PV 2 .03519 SP/VF + PV 3.48
PF 2 .00194 SP/VF + PF
.19
PVF 2 .02731 SP/VF + PVF 2.70
SP/VF 40 .01011 SP/VF
Condition (C) 1 .03628 SC/VF + C 2.18
CV 1 .00358 SC/VF + CV .21
CF 1 .02731 SC/VF + CF 1.64
CVF 1 .00670 SC/VF + CVF .40
SC/VF 20 .01665 SC/VF
.0404
.0794
PC
PCV
PCF
PCVF
SPC/VF
2
2
2
2
40
01096
01805
04888
03455
02028
SPC/VF + PC .54
SPC/VF + PCV .89
SPC/VF + PCF 2.41
SPC/VF + PCVF 1.70
SPC/VF
Random Effects Variable: Subjects
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TABLE 16
RESULTS OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON RT FOR EXPERIMENT 2
ANALYSIS OVER SUBJECTS
Source df
Between Subjects 19
MS Contributions to EMS
Version (V)
Form (F)
VF
Subjects (S) /VF
1
1
1
16
319742.74
261.26
1042639.26
195457.01
S/VF + V 1.64
S/VF + F
.00
S/VF + VF 5.33
S/VF
0346
Within Subjects 60
SOA (X)
XV
XF
XVF
SX/VF
Condition (C)
CV
CF
CVF
SC/VF
1 579.91 SX/VF + X
.02
1 109803.60 SX/VF + XV 4.17
1 3086.24 SX/VF + XF
.12
1 3659.73 SX/VF + XVF
.14
16 26346.84 SX/VF
1 36597.86 SC/VF + C 1.23
1 17860.77 SC/VF + CV .60
1 3276.16 SC/VF + CF .11
1 44514.80 SC/VF + CVF 1.50
16 29695.11 SC/VF
.0581
XC
XCV
XCF
XCVF
SXC/VF
1
1
1
1
16
11295.74
16797.68
1096.90
119177.50
81200.14
SXC/VF + XC .14
SXC/VF + XCV .21
SXC/VF + XCF .01
SXC/VF + XCVF 1.47
SXC/VF
Random Effects Variable: Subjects
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TABLE 17
RESULTS OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON RT FOR EXPERIMENT 2-
ANALYSIS OVER ITEMS
Source df MS Contributions to EMS
Between Items
CI/S
XC
xcs
XCI/S
23
Set (S) 1
Items (I) /S 22
Within Items 72
SOA (X) 1
XS 1
XI/S 22
Condition (C) 1
CS 1
22
1
1
22
7228.50
58972.00
1657.40
102.03
105750.00
29651.00
5265.70
60353.00
9286.00
53.69
49351.00
I/S + S
I/S
XI/S + XS + X
XI/S + XS
XI/S
CI/S + CS + C
CI/S + CS
CI/S
XCI/S + XCS + XC
XCI/S + xcs
XCI/S
.00
.or
.00 >.2500
.51**
.09 >.2500
.20***
.00 >.2500
Random Effects Variables: Set, Items
Tested against an error term consisting of a pool of MSxi/s and MSXS
to yield MS* = 202313.04 on 23 df (preliminary test of XS against XI/S
resulted in non-significant alpha level > .25).
*Tested against an error term consisting of a pool of MS C i/s and MS C s
to yield MS** = 57959.38 on 23 df (preliminary test of CS against CI/S
resulted in non-significant alpha level > .25).
**Tested against an error term consisting of a pool of MSxci/s and
MSxcs to yield MS*** = 47206.68 on 23 df (preliminary test of XCS
against XCI/S resulted in non-significant alpha level > .25).
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TABLE 18
RESULTS OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON NAMING LATENCY FOR EXPERIMENT 3-
ANALYSIS OVER SUBJECTS
Source df MS Contributions to EMS
Between Subjects 26
(L) 2 12804.48 S/L + L 57Subjects (S) /L 24 22474.10 S/L
Within Subjects 54
Condition (C) 2
CL 4
SC/L 48
19590.91
471.44
957.12
SC/L + C
SC/L + CL
SC/L
20.74
.49
0000
Random Effects Variable: Subjects
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TABLE 19
RESULTS OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON NAMING LATENCY FOR EXPERIMENT 3-
ANALYSIS OVER ITEMS
Source df MS Contributions to EMS
Between Items
Set (S)
Items (I) /S
44
2
42
161.31
5177.94
I/S
I/S
+ S 03
Within Items 90
Condition (C) 2 29815.72
CS 4 11562.15
CI/S 84 1394.78
CI/S + CS
CI/S + CS
CI/S
+ c 2.58
8.29 0000
Random Effects Variables: Set, Items
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TABLE 20
BONFERRONI T-TESTS ON NAMING LATENCY FOR EXPERIMENT 3
Test Mean Diff SD Dlf
f
df
Inf./Pos. vs. Non-Inf./Pos. 51.79 51.96 5.18 26 < 0500Inf. /Pos. vs. Inf./Neut. 13.05 31.77 2.14 26 ^OSOO
'Needed for significance: p < .0500 (family-wise error rate = 05 one-tailed).
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TABLE 21
RESULTS OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON NAMING LATENCY FOR EXPERIMENT 4-
ANALYSIS OVER SUBJECTS
Source df MS ^UULLlDUL lOnS tO fciMo F P
Between Subjects 19
List (L) 3 30077. 72 S/L + L 1. 56
Subjects (S) /L 16 19327. 60 S/L
Within Subjects 60
Condition (C) 1 56063. 46 SC/L + C 40. 55 .0000
CL 3 1214. 89 SC/L + CL 88
SC/L 16 1382. 65 SC/L
Type of Prime (T) 1 2012. 82 ST/L + T 4. 89 .0419
TL 3 1565. 65 ST/L + TL 3. 80 .0312
ST/L 16 411. 70 ST/L
CT 1 1334. 49 SCT/L + CT 2. 13
CTL 3 1234. 99 SCT/L + CTL 1. 97
SCT/L 16 625. 40 SCT/L
Random Effects Variable: Subjects
TABLE 22
RESULTS OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON NAMING LATENCY FOR EXPERIMENT 4-
ANALYSIS OVER ITEMS
Source df MS Contributions to EMS F P
Between Items 47
3 3919
.
30 I/S + S .54
Items (I) /S 44 7286. 10 I/S
Within Items 144
Condition (C) 1 134204. 70 CI/S + CS + C 5.83
. 0946
CS 3 23013. 20 CI/S + CS 7.71 .0003
CI/S 44 2983. 00 CI/S
Type of Prime (T) 1 5272. 60 TI/S + TS + T .42
TS 3 12663. 00 TI/S + TS 8.05 .0002
TI/S 44 1573. 70 TI/S
CT 1 3140. 00 CTI/S + CTS + CT .07
CTS 3 42229. 00 CTI/S + CTS 25.09 .0000
CTI/S 44 1683. 30 CTI/S
Random Effects Variables: Set, Items
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TABLE 23
BONFERRONI T-TESTS ON NAMING LATENCY FOR EXPERIMENT 4
Test Mean Diff SDd i F f t df *P
Inferred:
Non-Inf
.
:
Pos.
Pos.
vs
. Neut
.
vs
. Neut
1.86
18.20
39.06
33.25
.21
2.45
19
19 <.0500
Needed for significance: p < .0500 (family-wise error rate = 05
tailed).

